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ABSTRACT 
 
THE SECURITY FIRST APPROACH: CAUSES OF SECURITY 
PRIORITIZATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS PRIORITIZATION ON 
DEMOCRACY IN THE CASES OF SINGAPORE AND AZERBAIJAN  
 
Nur AlkıĢ 
M.A. Department of International Relations  
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı  
 
December 2009 
 
The security-democracy relationship is an interesting issue that has drawn 
scholarly attention. The security first approach is a new input in the field. It looks 
the issue from the Western foreign policy perspective and discusses what should 
be done by Western powers in the failed and rogue states to build security and 
democracy. It claims that first security must be established, and then democracy 
would gradually consolidate, rather than democracy promotion. Such a shift in 
Western foreign policy would have significant impact for the developing world, 
facing the challenge of political-economic development and security-democracy 
building at the same time. This thesis aims to apply security first approach to 
developing world. It analyzes the causes of security prioritization and implications 
of this prioritization on democracy, in the cases of Singapore and Azerbaijan to 
verify the security first approach’s claims. Both of these countries have applied a 
security first approach after they gained independence. They have also established 
some democratic institutional and legal structures. However, the worry of the 
ruling elites about losing security and power led them constantly delay 
democratization and restrict political arena. The governments of both cases have 
been successful in maintaining security and stability, yet this did not give way to 
the gradual triumph of democracy as argued by security first approach. Western 
cooperation with the governments of these countries, due to the formers’ interest 
in the stability of both countries and regimes can be argued to have contributed to 
the security of the states and their ruling elites, but not to the democratization 
process and the security of the people. Hence, the thesis argues that the discussion 
in the Western foreign policy should not be about security versus democracy, but 
rather about striving for security and democracy concurrently in the developing 
world. 
 
 Keywords: Security, Stability, Democracy, Democratization, Security First, 
Singapore, Azerbaijan                                                    
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ÖZET 
 
ÖNCE GÜVENLĠK YAKLAġIMI: SĠNGAPUR VE AZERBAYCAN 
ÖRNEKLERĠNDE GÜVENLĠĞĠN ÖNCELĠKLEġTĠRĠLMESĠNĠN NEDENLERĠ 
VE BU ÖNCELĠKLEġTĠRMENĠN DEMOKRASĠYE ETKĠSĠ 
 
 
Nur AlkıĢ 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler Bölümü  
Tez DanıĢmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
 
Aralık 2009 
  
Güvenlik-demokrasi iliĢkisi akademik dünyada ilgi çeken ve çalıĢılan bir 
konu olagelmiĢtir. Bu alana yeni bir katkı olan önce güvenlik yaklaĢımı, güvenlik-
demokrasi iliĢkisini Batılı ülkelerin dıĢ politika perspektifinden ele alarak, 
baĢarısız ve haydut devletlerde güvenlik ve demokrasinin tesisi için Batılı 
devletlerce ne yapılması gerektiğini tartıĢmakta ve önceliğin güvenliğin teminine 
verilmesi gerektiğini, demokrasinin zaman içerisinde geliĢeceğini savunmaktadır. 
Batılı ülkelerin dıĢ politikalarında bu türlü bir değiĢikliğe gidilmesi, siyasi ve 
ekonomik kalkınma ile güvenlik ve demokrasiyi aynı zamanda gerçekleĢtirmek 
durumunda kalan üçüncü dünyayı da etkileyecektir. Bu çalıĢma önce güvenlik 
yaklaĢımını üçüncü dünyaya uyarlamayı amaçlamakta, bu doğrultuda Singapur ve 
Azerbaycan örneklerinde güvenliğin öncelikleĢtirilmesinin nedenlerini ve bu 
öncelikleĢtirmenin demokrasiye etkisini incelemektedir. Her iki ülke de 
bağımsızlığını kazandıktan sonra önce güvenlik anlayıĢını benimsemiĢtir. Aynı 
zamanda bazı demokratik kurumsal ve yasal düzenlemeleri kabul etmiĢtir. Ancak, 
yönetimlerin güvenliği ve iktidarı kaybetme endiĢesi, demokratikleĢmenin sürekli 
ertelenmesine ve siyasi alanın kısıtlanmasına neden olmuĢtur. Ġki ülkede de 
iktidarlar, güvenlik ve istikrarı sağlamıĢtır, ancak bu önce güvenlik yaklaĢımınca 
savunulduğu üzere demokrasinin zaferiyle sonuçlanmamıĢtır. Batılı güçlerin 
çıkarları doğrultusunda bu hükümetleri desteklemeleri, hem devletlerin hem de 
hükümetlerin güvenliğine katkı sağlamıĢtır, ancak ne demokratikleĢme sürecine 
ne de insanların güvenliğine katkıda bulunmamıĢtır. Bu nedenle, bu çalıĢma Batılı 
ülkelerin dıĢ politikalarının güvenlik mi yoksa demokrasi mi argümanı yerine, 
geliĢmekte olan ülkelerde güvenlik ve demokrasinin aynı zamanda temini için 
çabalanmasına odaklanması gerektiğini savunmaktadır.  
 
 Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik, Ġstikrar, Demokrasi, DemokratikleĢme, Önce 
Güvenlik, Singapur, Azerbaycan                                                   
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In the post Cold War era following the collapse or change of communist systems in 
Europe and Asia, many Western democracies have adopted strategies in their 
foreign policies that emphasize the promotion of democracy. Arguments for pushing 
democracy have developed around the hypothesis that more democracies mean 
fewer wars and therefore fewer problems of security for most states and regions.
1
 
The argument not only suggests that democracies do not fight each other but that 
democracy reduces the likelihood of political repression, hence the fostering of 
democracy and efforts to reduce the levels of political repression in less developed 
countries have been accepted as a grand strategy of the U.S. and the West.
2
 Former 
President of the U.S. Bill Clinton adopted this understanding during his campaign in 
1992 that the strategic interests and moral values of America are rooted in extension 
of democracy. He said “As we help democracy to expand, we make ourselves and 
our allies safer. Democracies rarely go war with each other or traffic in terrorism.”3 
Later Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rise highlighted this understanding: 
                                                 
1
Ursula E. Daxecker, 2007, “Perilous Polities? An Assessment of the Democratization-Conflict 
Linkage”, European Journal of International Relations, 13 (4), pp. 527-528; Raju G. C. Thomas, 
1996, Democracy, Security and Development in India, New York: St. Martin Press, p. 2 
2
 Patrick M. Regan and Errol A. Henderson, 2002, “Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in 
Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?”, Third World Quarterly, 23 (1), p. 
119; The White House, 1996, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 
3
 Bill Clinton is quoted in Piki Ish-Shalom, “For a Democratic Peace of Mind: Politicization of the 
Democratic Peace Theory”, Harvard International Review: Web Perspectives 
 2 
President Bush outlined the vision for it in his second inaugural address: 
“It is the policy of the U.S. to seek and support the growth of democratic 
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”. …Our experience of this 
new world leads us to conclude that the fundamental character of 
regimes matter more today than the international distribution of power. 
The phenomenon of weak and failing states is not new, but the danger 
they now pose is unparalleled. The goal of our statecraft is to help create 
a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of 
their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international 
system. Stability without democracy will prove to be false stability.
4
 
 
Democracy promotion, as a source of security and stability building, keeps its 
significance as one of foreign policy strategies of the U.S., yet due to the difficulties 
faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, its relevance is started to be questioned.  “Strategic 
Leadership: Framework for a 21
st
 Century National Security Strategy”5, a report 
outlining recommendations for a new national security strategy for the next U.S. 
president underlines:  
Our core goals today are the same ones envisaged by our founding 
fathers: the resolute pursuit of security, liberty, and prosperity both for 
our own people and as the basis for a just and stable inter-national order. 
…Operationally, strategic leadership has five principal requisites: 
exercising strong state-craft, ensuring 21st century military strength, 
enhancing prosperity and development, encouraging democracy and 
human rights, and energizing America at home. It also means setting 
priorities. …While America remains the single most powerful country 
in the world today, it cannot take global leadership for granted, nor can 
it revert to what worked in previous eras. …the U.S. must be pragmatic 
and flexible enough to work with a wide variety of states on different 
issues. 
 
Correspondingly, Etzioni argues that no state has unlimited resources and 
leverage and accordingly, it should set clear priorities. He argues that the report 
centers on the promotion of “security, liberty and prosperity” and these key factors 
are not assembled in random order. Security is listed first because “the right to live 
is more basic than all others, as all other are contingent on security.” According to 
                                                 
4
 Condoleezza Rice, 11.12.2005, “The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom is the 
Only Realistic Path to Security”, The Washington Post 
5
 Michael A. McFaul et al., 2008, “Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National 
Security Strategy”, Centre for a New American Security 
 3 
him people trade democracy for security. “Only once security is reasonably secured 
do people become keen to have their legal and political rights respected”.6 Most 
significantly, security must be promoted in failing states and in dealing with rogue 
states without first trying to build democracy in such unwelcoming terrains. Insistent 
support of the U.S. for democratization or regime change in these states undermines 
both security and democracy rather than contributes them. Offering security 
guarantees or other international rewards might work better. Democratization will 
happen at its own pace after security established.
7
 Moreover, security first 
understanding claims that the U.S. should not abstain to work with the illiberal 
religious, ethnic or tribal groups, while dealing with countries at transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy, given that they provide basic security
8
 and do not 
prevent democratization in the long run and cooperate with the U.S. in countering 
terrorism.
9
 Etzioni argues for a “principled realism” having both moral foundations 
and practicality. It is moral because it highlights the primacy of life and personal 
security, and it is practical because it determines the objectives in accordance with 
the available resources and sets clear priorities.
10
 
Why one should pay attention to this issue? Because a shift in the U.S. 
foreign policy in the direction of prioritizing security over democracy would not 
only affect the so called failed and rogue states and the relationship of the U.S. with 
                                                 
6
 Amitai Etzioni, 2008, “A National Security Strategy for the Next Administration”, Military Review, 
pp. 99-100 
7
 Amitai Etzioni, 2007, “Security First Ours, Theirs and the Global Order‟s”, The National Interest, 
p. 13 
8
 For Etzioni basic security refers to “conditions –both domestic and international- under which most 
people, most of the time, are able to go about their lives, venture onto the street, work, study and 
participate in public life (politics included) without acute fear of being killed or injured”. Etzioni, 
2007, “Security First Ours, Theirs and the Global Order‟s”, p. 11 
9
 Amitai Etzioni, 2007, Security First for a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy, New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press, p. 151 
10
 Etzioni, 2007, “Security First Ours, Theirs and the Global Order‟s”, p. 11 
 4 
these states, but have significant impact for the developing world
11
, which 
encompasses the most of the countries and the population of the world. Developing 
countries face the challenge of political and economic development and security 
building at the same time with limited capacity and sources. These are the 
unavoidable needs of both states and their citizens. It is a fact that everyone wants to 
be secure and at the same time have liberty and political and civic rights. Security 
first approach presents security and democracy as two good deeds that one wants to 
have all together, but it also states that under circumstances that the two cannot be 
maintained simultaneously first security must be established, because security is the 
base where all other good deeds are built on. The situation that prevents security and 
democracy to be established concurrently is emerged due to the difficulty of the task 
and limited resources. Security first approach is developed as a kind of reaction to 
the American foreign policy based on democracy promotion with imperial 
sentiments and solution to the insufficiency of resources, a situation posing a choice 
among the needs. Etzioni primarily considers the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
where U.S. has been trying to establish democracy. These countries have no 
familiarity with democracy and its institutions and each day there emerges serious 
security problems. Under these conditions it is not possible to promote democracy. 
Besides, U.S. does not have limited resources to spend for these countries. The 
solution for Etzioni is to set priorities in line with the available resources and 
                                                 
11
 It can be argued that the use of the concept of developing world (Third World may also be used), 
encompassing huge number of states, is problematic, since such thinking assumes the homogeneity 
of all those states. Developing world is composed of an array of states that are different in their 
economic, political and social conditions. Yet, in theoretical terms, analysts seem to agree that the 
central feature of the developing world is its being in the process of political and economic 
development, facing the pressures of state building and democratization. The colonial past, the 
artificial boundaries drawn by European powers and lack of social cohesion are other accepted 
common figures of developing countries. Barry Buzan, 1998, “Conclusions: System versus Units in 
Theorizing about the Third World”, in S. Neuman (ed.), International Relations Theory and the Third 
World, New York: St. Martin‟s Press, pp. 217-218; Brian Job, 1992,“Insecurity Dilemma: National, 
Regime and State Securities in the Third World”, in B. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National 
Security of Third World States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. 19  
 5 
priority is the security. Security first approach deals with the democracy-security 
relationship from the perspective of Western powers‟ foreign policy and argues 
what kind of foreign policy Western powers should follow in failed and rogue states 
that have no political, economic and security structures and launch a transition 
period without any experience of democracy. It advocates to the Western powers the 
proper allocation of resources and prioritization in foreign policy making, but it also 
advocates policies with regard to the domestic politics of so called failed and rogue 
states. When security first approach is applied to developing countries, as a concern 
of domestic politics, it becomes possible to argue that for the developing world, 
which faces the difficult task of responding to different needs concurrently and the 
pressure of the resource scarcity
12
 much severer than the U.S., making a 
prioritization between the two needs: democracy and security is unavoidable. Since 
the right to physical security is more basic than the right to democracy according to 
security first understanding, first security must be established. By this way, the way 
for democracy to flourish gradually would be opened.  
Security and democracy are two values that both are inevitably necessary for 
the human being in the modern world system, and have a complex interaction. 
Security first approach that emerged under certain circumstances is a current attempt 
to understand this relationship. Etzioni argues that democracy promotion as an 
American mission has been unsuccessful. Contrary to the democratic peace theory, 
he claims that maintenance of security provides the necessary conditions for 
democracy, not the other way around. He presents security as a precondition for 
democracy, while claiming that democratization is an unstable process. There are 
also studies emphasizing the unconstructive relationship between the two concepts. 
                                                 
12
 It is important to note that for the developing world, scarcity of resources includes not only 
economic power and means but also institutional and political capacity and qualified human sources. 
 6 
Some scholars have associated democratization with rising political instability or 
violence.
13
 Others highlight the pressures of security that place stress on the 
maintenance of democratic process and political oppression used by states against 
their population in the name of security concerns.
14
 The security-democracy 
relationship is an interesting issue that has drawn scholarly attention. The theories 
on democracy-security relationship, including security first approach, will be 
explained in the following chapter. They all pay attention to the relationship 
between the two and the implication of one on the other both at interstate and 
intrastate levels. Many scholars also emphasize the issue with regard to developing 
world. Security first approach is a current contribution to the subject; therefore it is 
worth to pay attention. Yet, the significance of studying security first approach does 
not only stem from its being a new input in the field, but rather from the potential 
implications of its claims for the developing world, being in the process of political 
and economic development, facing the concurrent pressures of security and 
democracy building. Security first approach looks the issue from the American 
foreign policy perspective. However, it discusses what should be done by Western 
powers within the concerned countries, thus it also covers the intrastate level and 
becomes important for the domestic politics of the developing world. This is why 
security first approach is chosen in this study. 
This thesis aims to apply security first approach to the developing countries. 
Drawing upon such an understanding, it will examine why security is a priority and 
what the impact of security prioritization is on democracy in the developing world. 
                                                 
13
 Samuel Huntington, 2006, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University 
Press; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 1995, “Democratization and War Dangers of 
Transition ”, Foreign Affairs, 79 
14
 Ken Booth, „1995, Human Wrongs and International Relations‟, International Affairs 71 (1),;  
Robert H. Jackson, 1992, “The Security Dilemma in Africa” in Brian L. Job (ed.), Security Dilemma: 
National Security of Third World States, Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
 7 
In order to understand and verify the security first approach‟s claims regarding the 
premium of security over democracy and inevitability of the democracy‟s gradual 
triumph once security is maintained, cases from the developing world must be 
studied. The cases of the study are Singapore and Azerbaijan. Hence, the research 
question is: What are the causes of security prioritization and implications of this 
prioritization on democracy in the cases of Singapore and Azerbaijan? 
Singapore and Azerbaijan are interesting cases for analyzing the 
prioritization of security and impact of security first understanding on democracy. 
The governments of the both countries have adopted security first approach under 
different, but at the same time some common internal and external circumstances: 
Singapore in the years of Cold War, as a small city state, with a multiethnic society, 
trying to establish its independence, being dependent to external world for economic 
success, Azerbaijan in the post Cold War period, in a conflictual region, at war with 
its neighbour, trying to establish its independence, being dependent to foreign 
investment for economic  development. In these countries, security is understood in 
the military and political framework, encompassing external security and internal 
stability, and to some extend synonymous with security from violence and survival. 
In both cases, the primacy of the need for security and stability has been kept on the 
public agenda by the ruling elite to be able to hold on to power and given way to 
rather undemocratic policies.  
Singapore‟s vulnerability as a small territory lacking of natural resources 
compared to its relatively larger neighbors in Southeast Asia and its total 
dependency on the external world for its livelihood provided the politicians a good 
reason in convincing Singaporeans of the urgency of the survival issue.
15
 It is argued 
                                                 
15
 Alan Chong, 2004, “Singaporean Foreign Policy and The Asian Values Debate, 1992-2000: 
Reflections on an Experiment in Soft Power”, The Pacific Review, 17 (1), p. 98 
 8 
that the political culture of Singapore became “a subject culture” because of the 
strong belief in the importance of stability for the sake of ensuring survival.
16
 
Likewise, Azerbaijani political elite has used Karabakh conflict to justify harsh 
measures repressing protest at the conduct of the elections. The regime consistently 
appealed to the need for social stability, claiming that Azerbaijan‟s defeat in the war 
had been due to domestic instability.
17
 Moreover, dependency on foreign investment 
in the case of Singapore and on oil revenues in the case of Azerbaijan has kept the 
significance of security and political stability.  Singaporean politicians provide a 
safe home for locals and foreigners, without which Singapore would easily lose 
investors‟ confidence. In the early 1980s outside observers ranked Singapore as 
“one of the safest and most profitable locations in the world”.18 By signing “the 
contract of the century” to explore three offshore fields with the BP-led oil 
consortium, Azerbaijan provided the West with huge energy resources, this in turn 
ensured Azerbaijani government of extensive Western capital and diplomatic 
backing and increased the interest of the West in the stability of the region.
19
 Hence 
U.S. and Western countries in general, have paid attention to the stability and 
security of the both countries due to their strategic considerations and cooperated 
with the governments of these countries despite their undemocratic polices. For the 
U.S, Singapore‟s economic and political development was “a bastion against 
communism‟s progress in Southeast Asia” and Azerbaijan‟s cooperation with the 
                                                 
16
 Seah Chee Meow, 1984, “Political Change and Continuity in Singapore” in Y. P. Seng and L. C. 
Yah (eds.), Singapore: Twenty-Five Years of Development, Singapore: Nan Yang Xing Zhou Lianhe 
Zaobao, p. 240 
17
 Farid Guliyev, 2005, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An 
Attempt at Conceptualization”, Demokratizatsiya, 13 (3), pp. 421-423; Rasim Musabayov, 2005, 
“The Karabakh Conflict and Democratization in Azerbaijan” 
18
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Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper 78, pp. 4-7  
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U.S. and West in general, in security issues provided a significant contribution to the 
international counter-terrorism efforts.
20
 Stability and security have also been the 
continuous concern of people, different societal groups and classes that are 
incorporated into the system and dependent on the existing rule to carry on their 
lives. 
The structure of the thesis is divided into six chapters. Introductory chapter 
gives basic information about the thesis. It describes the significance of the topic 
and the purpose of the thesis. It also clears the disposition of the study. In chapter I, 
concepts of security, stability, democracy and democratization are discussed and the 
literature on the security-democracy linkage is reviewed. The studies on the 
relationship between democracy -democratization- and security -war and stability- 
can be grouped under four approaches: i. democratic peace theory, which perceives 
democracy as a precondition of security (democracies do not fight each other at 
interstate level, democracies do not employ repressive behavior at state level), ii. 
those seeing democratization as cause of insecurity-instability, iii. those 
emphasizing the negative impact of state and military-centric security understanding 
on democracy, iv. security first approach that presents security as the basic value on 
which other things can be founded and claim democracy‟s gradual triumph after the 
maintenance of security. Chapter II and III are the case studies. These chapters aim 
to provide a general outlook towards Singapore and Azerbaijan successively to 
understand the impact of the security first understanding on the process of 
democratization. Here the conditions that gave way to the prioritization of security 
and stability and the outcomes of this prioritization will be explored. In chapter IV, 
the two cases will be compared. In both cases it is significant that governments have 
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employed the causes that gave way to the prioritization of security, as tools to stay 
in power and limit the consolidation of democracy, by the backing of the U.S. and 
Western countries that put security first in accordance with their strategic concerns, 
such as containing communism, investing in socially stable countries, securing 
energy resources and countering terror. Conclusion includes the main findings of the 
study and discusses how the theoretical findings of the study can be converted to 
policy implementation.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
DEFINITIONS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter comprises three parts. In the first part, the different conceptualizations 
of the terms of security, stability, democracy and democratization and how they are 
defined in this study will be explained. In the second part, the literature on the 
security-democracy relationship will be reviewed. The studies on the linkage 
between democracy –democratization- and security -war and stability- can be 
grouped under four approaches: i. democratic peace theory, which perceives 
democracy as a precondition of security (democracies do not fight each other at 
interstate level, democracies do not employ repressive behavior at state level), ii. 
those seeing democratization as cause of insecurity and instability, iii. those 
emphasizing the negative impact of state and military-centric security understanding 
on democracy, iv.  security first approach that presents security as the basic value on 
which other things can be founded and claim democracy‟s gradual triumph after the 
maintenance of security. 
 This study aims to verify the assumptions of security first approach 
regarding its impact on security-democracy challenge of developing countries in 
domestic politics. Yet, it is important to understand other theories on security-
 12 
democracy relationship to comprehend the contribution of the security first approach 
to the literature. Moreover, each theory has significant assumptions about the 
interaction between security and democracy, in general and particularly in the 
developing world, which are important to understand how security has been 
prioritized and how this process has affected democracy in the cases.  
 
2.2. Definitions of Concepts 
2.2.1. Security 
Reaching a consensus on the concept of security has remained elusive. Predictably, 
security has been a term that tried to be defined as long as there have been human 
societies. However, as a subject of academic query it is a relatively new concept that 
came to prominence after the Second World War in the Anglo-American academic 
world.
21
 The first definition came from Walter Lippmann in 1943. He stated that “A 
nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core 
values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by 
victory in such a war.”22 The tendency to define security as state and military-
centric, pro-status quo and synonymous with national security
23
 continued during 
the Cold War years. Buzan argues that security studies emerged as a precise answer 
to the problems of the bipolar world of the Cold War era, as an outcome of Western 
defense policy needs and dominated by neorealism.
24
 Therefore, it focused on the 
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promotion of the state/national security and maintenance of the status quo.
25
 
Neorealism assumes that states are the main actors in international relations, the 
domestic political structure is hierarchic, whereas the structure of the international 
system is anarchy.
26
 This anarchic structure shapes the relations among states and as 
a result, security becomes the primary concern of the states
27
, a concern to which 
any value can be sacrificed.
28
 States see all other states as potential enemies and 
threats to their national security, since they all seek power, assessment of which 
begin with military capabilities.
29
  
Despite the dominancy of military and state-centric security understanding, 
there have been significant attempts to broaden and deepen the definition. It is 
argued that other issues, such as economic, environmental and social threats, 
endanger the lives of individuals rather than strictly the survival of states.
30
 A 
number of scholars criticized neorealist definition due to its external orientation in 
threat perception and its emphasis on state and military dimension, especially with 
regard to the developing world. As Ayoob illustrates that the overwhelming 
frequency of military force since 1945 has been in intrastate and not interstate 
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 Stephanie G. Neuman, 1998, “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An 
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23, (2), 2002, pp. 334-5 
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conflicts.
31
 When the security of the developing countries is concerned, it is argued 
that the sense of threat that prevails is of internal threats rather than externally 
motivated threats to the existence of the state.
32
 From the point of Azar and Moon, 
understanding the security in the context of developing countries requires the 
consideration of not only the security environment and hardware but also the 
software side of security management that entails the political context and policy 
capacity through which threats are perceived, resources are distributed and policies 
are formulated. Political context, shaped by legitimacy and integration, and policy 
capacity are significant for the operationalization of security.
33
 The emphasis on 
military dimension draws attention away from the non-military threats that have the 
potential to undermine the stability of many nations.
34
 The studies of some scholars 
also draw attention to the impact of the international economic system on economic 
and political preferences of the developing countries, point the linkage between 
security and development in these countries, adds human dimension to the security 
by pointing to the need for secure food, health and trade systems and also stress the 
interaction of some of these areas.
35
  
Another significant attempt in defining security goes beyond broadening the 
dimensions of security (from military and political to social, economic and 
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environmental) to deepening the term by making the human being the referent of 
security and by accepting non-state actors as the agents of security.
36
 A further result 
of accepting human being as the referent of the security is the prioritization of the 
justice over security. By this way it is claimed that search for power and order 
cannot produce real security because “absolute power implies no change and where 
there is no change, there is unlikely to be justice.”37 Booth purports emancipation as 
a way to promote security and justice. Emancipation is defined as the “freeing of 
people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which 
stop them carrying out what they would freely chose to do”38 and refers to the 
“promotion of world-order values such as economic justice, nonviolence, ecological 
sustainability and human rights”.39 Those criticize the limited definition of security 
by neorealists, questions the origin and nature of the socially-constructed 
international order and the possibility of the transformation of this reality into one 
more conducive to human well-being. 
In this study, security is defined in the military and political framework, 
encompassing external and internal security in line with the security understanding 
of the case studies. Significance of the internal security derives from Singapore and 
Azerbaijan that belong to developing world. Besides, economic, environmental, 
societal and individual dimensions of security are excluded in order to keep the 
study within a certain framework. 
 
2.2.2. Political Stability 
                                                 
36
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The most common definition of the political stability is the absence of domestic 
conflict and violent behavior. There are also differing views equating the concept 
with: governmental longevity, the existence of a legitimate constitutional regime, 
the absence of structural change
40
, the regularity of the flow of political exchanges 
(the more regular the flow of political exchanges, the more stability)
41
 and the ratio 
of institutionalization to participation (as political participation increases, the 
complexity, autonomy, adaptability and coherence of the society‟s political 
institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained).
42
 
The essence of stability according to common definition is equilibrium 
among different forces. This equilibrium should be reached peacefully, otherwise 
law and order (status quo) will be endangered. A stable polity is seen as a peaceful, 
law-abiding society where decision-making and politico-societal changes are the 
result of institutionalized and functional procedures.
43
 Here, political stability is 
accepted with regard to the cases of the study, as the absence of internal conflict, 
management of clashes through state institutions and the maintenance of power 
equilibrium, while preserving the status quo. Both in Singapore and Azerbaijan, lack 
of domestic turmoil and maintenance of status quo has been highly appreciated, 
especially in the name of attracting foreign investors for the economic future and 
survival of the country. 
 
2.2.3. Democracy 
Democracy seems especially difficult to define because it is not a given or 
a thing in itself but rather a form of government and a process of 
governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. Any 
                                                 
40
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p. 449 
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„universal‟ definition is likely to ignore differences in detail or to need 
constant redefinition and adjustment. Moreover, since all democracies are 
more or less imperfect, finding a single definition that indicates precisely 
where “more or less” becomes “either/or” (a democracy or not a 
democracy) seems impossible.
44
  
 
As Rothstein points, democracy is elusive both as a concept and as a feasible 
objective. There are profound disagreements about the meaning of democracy. 
Aristotle defined democracy as rule by people, and this idea that in some way the 
people governs themselves is still the core meaning of democracy.
45
 But around this 
idea several related themes have developed that are now thought integral what 
democracy means or must be present for democracy to exist. These are: 1. free, fair 
and frequent elections (where coercion is comparatively uncommon), 2. inclusive 
suffrage (all adults‟ right to vote) 3. right to run for office (all adults‟ right to run for 
elections). 4. elected officials (providing representation)
46
, 5. freedom of expression 
(citizens‟ right to express themselves without danger of severe punishment on 
political matters, including criticism of  officials, the government etc.), 6. access to 
alternative sources of information, 7. associational autonomy (right to form 
relatively independent associations or organizations, including political parties), 8. 
inclusive citizenship (no representative of an ethnic, religious or other minority 
residing permanently in the country and subject to its laws can be denied the rights 
that are available to others).
47
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There is a tension between two different conceptions of democracy. While the 
minimalist tradition, labeled “electoral democracy” understands democracy as an 
electoral system and emphasize the first four themes, the broader perspective, 
labeled “liberal democracy” says that democracy requires not only a transparent 
electoral procedure, but also the respect for civic rights and political freedoms.
48
 
Given that democracy is the rule by the people and for the people and a system 
designed for peaceful resolution of differences, the liberal perspective stresses 
government accountability to the public and the need for the government‟s powers 
to be limited by the rule of law.
49
 The liberal definition has become dominant in the 
Western world and internationally, yet this definition excludes any connection to 
socio-economic conditions or respect for economic and social rights.
50
 
In this study, the liberal definition of democracy will be used although it lacks 
socio-economic rights, in order to keep the study in the political framework. 
Additionally, in both cases of the study, governments have used economic facilities, 
such as social housing and infrastructure projects, to gain a kind of performance 
legitimacy rather than seeing it as part of democratic rights. It is also important to 
keep in mind that elements of democracy are state and citizen; hence democracy is 
certain class of relations between state and citizens.
51
 Here the essence of 
democracy lies in its empowerment of ordinary citizens. Therefore, democracy is 
more than simply passing laws that formally establish political rights to give power 
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to people; it includes the implementation of those laws.
52
 Performance of the laws is 
crucial, because both Singapore and Azerbaijan have adopted democratic 
institutional and legal setups, yet political and civil liberties have been restrained 
through the incorporation of the formal procedures into informal power relations.  
 
2.2.4. Democratization 
The word democratization refers to political changes moving in a democratic 
direction. In accordance with the definition of the democracy, made in the previous 
part, the character of that movement over time is from less accountable to more 
accountable government, from less competitive (or non-existent) elections to freer 
and fairer competitive elections, from severely restricted to better protected civil and 
political rights, from weak (or non-existent) autonomous organizations in civil 
society to more autonomous and more numerous organizations.
53
 
Democratization can take many different forms and need not to proceed in a 
unidirectional or linear fashion. The significance is that there should be steady 
movement towards democracy. The legitimacy of political rule, institutionalized 
political parties, the strength of civil society are important factors for evaluating the 
chances for democratic consolidation.
54
 Legitimacy of political rule, the strength of 
opposition parties and civil society, freedom of media and fairness of elections are 
discussed in the cases of Singapore and Azerbaijan, while the implications of 
security first understanding on democracy is analyzed. 
  
2.3. Literature Review  
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Although security and democracy are the two goods which are sought in every 
political community, they have conventionally been treated separately. One reason 
is the traditional gap between the study of domestic and external spheres of state 
behaviour which is reflected in a corresponding gap between students of 
comparative politics and political development on the one hand, and those of foreign 
policy and international relations on the other.
55
  
Yet, the quest for security and the quest for democracy have become 
interlinked in the present liberal world order on the presumption that global security 
is best assured through peaceful relations among democracies, having shared values. 
The assumption that democracies do not fight each other and that democracies are 
internally less violent, led democracy promotion to become the major strategy of the 
foreign policies‟ of Western countries, particularly the U.S. However, the 
impression that the relationship between security and democracy is linear or casual 
would not be correct, due to the fact that some scholars have associated 
democratization with rising political instability or violence. It is argued that there 
have often been tensions between democratization and the prevention and 
management of conflict. One reason is that democratization raises political 
expectations, but at the same time tends to be resisted by those whose power and 
privileges it threatens.
 
The process of development and democratization is inherently 
destabilizing. It unleashes social forces in new directions with potential spillover to 
other countries. Democratic structures are more representative and consequently 
more conducive to stability and security. But in a fragmented society, political 
pluralism may lead to political paralysis and further fragmentation.
56
 Just as the 
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pressures of security may place stress on the maintenance of democratic process or 
may forestall democratic movements in democratizing countries. 
The studies on the relationship between democracy/democratization and 
security/stability are grouped under four categories: i. democratic peace theory, 
which perceives democracy as a precondition of security (democracies do not fight 
each other at interstate level, democracies do not employ repressive behavior at state 
level), ii. those seeing democratization as cause of insecurity and instability, iii. 
those emphasizing the negative impact of state and military-centric security on 
democracy, iv.  security first approach that presents security as the basic value on 
which other things can be founded and claim democracy‟s gradual triumph after the 
maintenance of security.  
 
2.3.1. Democratic Peace Theory  
Ever since the beginning of the 20
th
 century, when real democracy 
started to take hold in many countries, violent military conflicts between 
democracies have been rare. And full scale wars between democracies 
have been virtually non-existent… The more democratic any two 
countries are, the less likely they are to get into disputes that kill people 
and the less violent any such conflicts are likely to be… The democratic 
peace makes a contribution to good policy, but it is not a panacea. It is 
not a valid excuse to make war in order to establish democracy.
57
 
 
One of the major tenets of U.S. foreign policy has been the encouragement and 
support of democratization in the world. At the core of this argument is a national 
security objective of a less war-prone world. The linkage between a more peaceful 
world and more states with democratic political system is the belief that democratic 
states are unlikely to fight wars against each other; the democratic peace 
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proposition.
58
 Though it is not free of criticism, the consensus view is summed up in 
the remark that the “absence of war between democratic states comes as close as 
anything we have to an empirical law in international relations”.59 
The primary claim of democratic peace proponents is that democratic states do 
not wage war against each other, although a number of scholars have modified the 
claim to the proposition that “democracies are less likely to fight wars with each 
other” or “democracies are less violent than non-democracies.”60  
Explanations of the democratic peace typically fall into one or a combination 
of three main categories: i. democratic institutions place constraints on the ability of 
leaders to fight other democracies or simply make them reluctant to choose war; ii. 
norms shared by democratic states cause them to view each other as pacific and 
unthreatening; iii. democracy tends to foster economic interdependence, which 
reduces the likelihood of war.
61
  
The arguments of this theory have mostly been applied to existing liberal 
democracies in prosperous regions of Western Europe and North America.
 
Raju 
Thomas claims that “the absence of wars in these regions may be attributable to 
their cultures and affluence rather than their political systems”.62 Likewise 
Henderson, in this book Democracy and War, argues that factors such as bipolarity, 
alliance membership, nuclear deterrence and trade links, beyond regime type led to 
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the relative absence of interstate war between democracies.
63
 Furthermore, he claims 
that the clearest implication of his study‟s findings is that “democratic enlargement, 
as a strategy, is not likely to be effective in reducing the likelihood of wars between 
or within states, and it is apt to increase the probability of war involvement for 
individual states.”64 
Although the concept of a democratic peace is derived from the experience of 
relations between states, there is also the argument that democracy reduces intense 
violence within states and democracies experience less political repression
65
 than 
non-democracies. Davenport‟s analysis reaches the conclusion that “whether a 
particular nation-state is fully democratic or merely becoming more so, government 
leaders in this situation are expected to be more tolerant of citizens‟ rights and relax 
previously imposed repressive activities.”66 Likewise, Poe and Tate‟s findings show 
that when states have higher levels of democracy, they tend to use political 
repression less frequently. Two factors account for the logic of this relationship. 
First, democratic leaders are more accountable to people and interest groups. 
Second, coercive agents within democracies are generally less inclined to go for 
repression.
67
 
Yet, Regan and Henderson link increased levels of repression with increased 
levels of threat, independent of the regime type. Here threat is conceptualized in 
terms of “the demands on a regime by opposition groups”. The effective institutions 
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of democracies are able to channel all forms of opposition into the formal political 
institutions of society. The result is that even the extreme demands of the opponents 
do not generate sufficient support to be considered threatening by the rulers in a 
democracy. On the other hand, the absence of legitimate channels for dissent in 
autocratic regimes ensures that regimes do not have to negotiate with opponents. 
The secure grip of elites on power and the police machinery frightens the public and 
makes domination more acceptable. With the opposition intimidated, the regime is 
not inclined to engage in violent forms of political repression.
68
 However, 
intermediate regimes like semi-democracies face competing pressures that increase 
the extent and credibility of the threats they faced. In response to this higher level of 
threat, semi-democracies employ higher levels of repression. In semi-democracies, 
the institutional infrastructure is usually not developed well enough to channel the 
demands of the opposition into the political arena. Thus, the responses by the 
leaders are limited by the scarcity of legitimate institutions. Moreover, citizens in 
semi-democracies have opportunity to express dissent publicly (compared with the 
citizens of autocracies) and make demands on the state. Since political leaders in 
semi-democracies are likely to perceive demands as a challenge to their fragile 
legitimacy, they are more likely to repress opponents.
69
 Thomas also argues that 
there are linkages between the degree of freedom of the individual and the degree of 
threats perceived by the state. In democracies as in authoritarian systems, the 
relative degree of freedom that the individual enjoys may increase or decrease 
depending on the level of threat perceived by the state. The greater the threat, the 
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greater the sacrifice demanded and the fewer the freedoms that may be enjoyed by 
the individual, whether these restrictions are obtained by voluntary or imposed 
means.
70
 
The significance of these studies for the thesis is their emphasis on the linkage 
between the threat perception of the elites and the use of political repression against 
the dissidents. This linkage is crucial to understand the context and the procedure 
that resulted in the implementation of undemocratic policies by the governments of 
Singapore and Azerbaijan. The disputed legitimacy of the regimes led them to 
perceive many demands of the society and different groups as threat to their rule and 
resorted the ruling elites to restrain political arena through repression.  
 
2.3.2. Democratization as cause of instability and insecurity  
Some scholars argue that the instability of democratic transitions increases the 
likelihood that democratizing states will initiate international conflict. According to 
Mansfield and Snyder, 
The idea that democracies never fight wars against each other has 
become an axiom for many scholars and also used by American 
statesmen to justify a foreign policy that encourages democratization 
abroad. It might be true that a world in which more countries were 
mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the U.S. 
But countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They 
usually go through a rocky transition…in this transitional phase of 
democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not 
less and they do fight wars with democratic states.
71
 
 
Democratization typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, 
unstable democratic coalitions, and high-energy mass politics. It brings new social 
groups and classes onto the political stage. Political leaders, finding no way to 
reconcile incompatible interests, resort to shortsighted and risky policies in order to 
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maintain their governing coalitions. Elites need to gain mass allies to defend their 
weakened positions. Therefore threatened elites may appeal to nationalist sentiment 
and in turn use force abroad to divert the public‟s attention from the power contests 
in the domestic sphere. Another reason that democratization is likely to produce 
“belligerent nationalism” is that the threatened traditional power bases by the new 
political structure might hope to get a benefit from war.
72
  
Contrarily, Galbreath argues that democratizing states, as opposed to 
authoritarian states exhibiting a brief period of liberalization, are inherently less 
prone to periods of international conflict. The underlying causes of the democratic 
transition encourage elites and the masses to turn away from the coercive policies of 
the previous regime. In particular, the military, will have a reducing position within 
civil politics as democratic reforms progress. The democratic institutions created at 
the beginning of the collapse of the previous regime allow mass politics and elite 
politics to rearrange themselves upon each other in a way that prevents those lost 
power in the new regime from taking extra political actions. These characteristics of 
democratic transitions reduce the possibility of international war by democratizing 
states.
73
  
In a similar way, the results of Daxecker and Ward&Gleditsch‟s studies 
show that democratizing polities are substantially less war prone. By focusing on the 
characteristics of transition process, they find that rapid transitions or reversals are 
associated with a countervailing effect; they increase the risk of being involved in 
warfare. Both in the long term and while societies undergo democratic change, the 
                                                 
72
 Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, “Democratization and War Dangers of Transition ”, pp. 83-90 
73
 David J. Galbreath, 2004, “Democratization and Inter-State War: Why Reform does not Encourage 
Conflict?”, Political Studies Association, 24 (3), pp. 206, 212-213 
 27 
risk of involvement in war are reduced by democratization and exacerbated by 
reversals in the democratization process.
74
 
The argument on the peaceful nature of the process of democratization is 
supplied with dissent. Huntington points that political decay and instability occur 
when popular mobilization outpaces political institutionalization.
75
 During the 1950s 
and 1960s the numerical incidence of political violence and disorder increased 
dramatically in most countries of the world. This violence and instability was in 
large part the product of rapid social change and rapid mobilization of new groups 
into politics coupled with slow development of political institutions. Political 
instability in modernizing countries is thus in large part a function of the gap 
between aspirations and expectations produced by escalation of aspirations which 
particularly occurs in the early phases of democratization.
76
  
Within a democratizing state, elite actors are striving for survival, while both 
political institutions and the economy are being reformed. Given this chaotic 
situation, there is great possibility of conflict between competing factions. 
Goldsmith argues that the successor regime to a dictatorship is frequently a partial 
democracy which can pose an even greater security threat. He points to the report of 
the Political Instability Task Force, according to which in the period of 1955 to 
2001, mixed regimes by its total accounted for more than one-third of all major 
political instability events, such as adverse shifts in patterns of governance, ethnic 
wars, revolutionary wars and genocides. Democratic regime change is strongly 
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correlated with internal military conflict, though the prospects for civil peace 
improve with time if the country evolves into an established democratic system.
77
  
The significance of the discussions, regarding the impact of democratization 
process on security and likelihood of war, for this study stems from their emphasis 
on the difficulty of the transformation process and the pressure it puts on the rulers. 
With in a transforming state, both political institutions and the economy are being 
reformed, while new social groups and classes come onto the political stage with 
different concerns. This situation forces the ruling elite to deal many and probably 
conflictual issues at the same time, with insufficient political, economic and human 
sources. This argument is important to understand the context that gives way to the 
prioritization of security. Since Singapore and Azerbaijan experienced such 
transition processes, the ruling elite of the both countries faced the difficult task of 
dealing with confrontational issues with limited resources. Moreover, the social and 
political turmoil emerged in this process -ethnic protests in Singapore and military 
coup attempts in Azerbaijan- resort the governments to prioritize security and to use 
restrictive measures.  
 
2.3.3. Negative Impact of State and Military-Centric Security on Democracy 
State and military-centric security studies do not pay attention on the link between 
security and democracy. Since political development and democratization fall within 
the boundaries of the internal domain, they often separate or overlook the effects of 
various policy measures for pursuing one on the other.
78
 Moreover it can be argued 
that in this understanding of security, practices regarding political development, 
democratization and human rights are relegated to secondary place, while order and 
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security of state are constantly essentialized. By whatever means security comes to 
be perceived as the core value, it gains priority over other policies. In other words, 
the choice between security and democracy would be biased toward security 
requirements. Al-Mahsat claims that security orientation has led to the development 
of institutions and the allocation of capabilities to tasks that offer little support for 
political development and democratization becomes secondary to “survival of the 
actor‟s autonomy”.79 In this understanding, people are called upon to give priority to 
state/national security and thus to consent to sacrifice of any value that will provide 
more security.
80
 
Scholars that are critical of state and military-centric security, in particular 
those studying the security of the developing world, made a significant contribution 
to the field by drawing attention to the impact of this understanding on democracy. 
They argue that sometimes the activities of state be the major source of insecurity 
for the individuals and groups especially in the developing countries. As discussed 
in the previous part, rulers of the developing countries are facing the pressures of 
state building, political and economic development, security and democratization at 
the same time, this led them to perceive different demands as a challenge to their 
fragile legitimacy and be more likely to repress their citizens.
81
 The preoccupation 
with security, particularly with internal threats to the regimes, might lead to certain 
decay in the democratization process. Moreover, it is claimed that existing power 
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structures – at global, regional or local levels – that determine who enjoys the 
entitlement to security and who does not is responsible for the insecurity of people.
82
  
The military and state-centric understanding of security, might result in 
undemocratic practices of states toward their population because of its prioritization 
of security over all other endeavors in general, and state security over security of 
citizens in particular. In this type of security, state/national security has priority 
because security of the state is seen as a precondition of the citizen‟s security. 
People‟s security is relegated to a secondary position due to the assumption that 
citizens feel safe and go on their daily lives without worry when the state is safe. If 
the concern regarding state/national security might gave way to downgrading of 
other endeavors including people‟s security and democracy, then how one can be 
sure that those deciding on security issues will not keep the security concerns 
prominent on public agenda in order to follow their own interests?
83
 The most 
probable answer to this question is through democratization of the state, because in 
democracies those having the power to decide on and make polices are accountable. 
They are responsible for their decisions and have to explain to the public the 
rationale behind their decisions. Here emerges the dilemma between security and 
democracy or to put it otherwise, between being preoccupied with security, 
particularly the internal threats to the regime, and staying in power and taking 
necessary steps for consolidation of democracy and losing power. This is also 
related with the postulation of the security first approach, regarding the gradual 
consolidation of democracy internally, after security is established. Here it is 
assumed that the ruling elite will perform democratization including enacting 
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political reforms, holding free and fair elections, advancing rule of law and making 
themselves accountable, after they provided security. The practicality of this 
assumption will be analyzed in the following chapters on Singapore and Azerbaijan.  
The significance of this approach for the thesis stems from its emphasis on 
the problem of prioritizing an endeavor over other things. When a value is chosen as 
a priority, unavoidably other values are put to secondary position and it becomes 
possible to delay or even sacrifice those for the core value. Actually, this happened 
in Singapore and Azerbaijan. Since security and stability have been kept on the 
agenda as the most important concern, democracy has constantly been delayed in 
the name of security. Moreover, this approach highlights that the decision between 
security and democracy is a political choice and if those making the choice are not 
accountable, how one can be sure about the rightness of this decision or whether the 
preferences will be reorganized in accordance with the changing needs of the 
country and the people rather than of the rulers. This paradox is also valid for 
Singapore and Azerbaijan.   
 
2.3.4. Security First Approach 
Democratization as the rallying cry of America‟s mission in the world 
has essentially failed. There are strong principled and pragmatic reasons 
to turn U.S. foreign policy 180 degrees: instead of assuming that 
democratizing nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan will turn them into 
guardians of the peace and reliable friends, we must aim first to ensure 
basic security -including freedom from deadly violence, maiming and 
torture-, both for its own sake and for the sake of the democracy that 
might gradually grow in these faraway places. Because security drives 
democracy, democracy does not beget security.
84
 
 
In his book “Security First for a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy”, Amitai 
Etzioni lays out a set of policy changes to guide the American foreign policy, 
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especially with taking into account the failure of the democratization efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. He is critical of democratic peace theory and democracy 
promotion as grand strategy of American foreign policy. By pointing the limited 
power and resources of the U.S., he argues for a “principled realism” having both 
moral foundations and practicality. Its morality comes from emphasizing the 
primacy of life and personal security, and its practicality derives from determining 
objectives and setting priorities in line with the available resources.
85
 The main 
points of the security first approach are explored in the following paragraphs. 
Democratic peace theory does not apply to the democratizing world, 
especially when democracy is tried to be established externally. Etzioni argues that 
democratization that has become a major part of a long-established American 
foreign policy, has been pursued by the U.S. since Woodrow Wilson‟s presidency 
and as late as 2004, it was still widely agreed that liberal democracy was on the 
march and that the U.S. should lead this historical trend. The trend was said to favor 
the West and world peace because democracies do not attack other democracies. By 
the end of 2005, however it became clear though not yet incorporated into the main 
American foreign policy that the world is not democratizing. Etzioni refers to 
Mansfield and Snyder‟s point that democratic peace theory may hold for truly 
liberal democracies but not do so far societies which are democratizing- “often a 
violent and unstable process”.86 Democratization creates a wider spectrum of 
politically significant groups with diverse interests. Those threatened by the change 
came with democratization, are often compelled to take an inflexible view of their 
interests. The political impasse is further deepened by the weakening of the central 
authority, unable to find way to reconcile incompatible interests. Drawing on the 
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lessons taken in Afghanistan and Iraq, he argues that in those societies having no 
experience of democracy and mature civil society, there is not much the U.S. can do 
to rush for democracy. Those came to power in Iraq and Afghanistan have been seen 
as puppets of the U.S. and the West and had neither power nor legitimacy to act 
effectively. Moreover, by dispending the political and military structures in these 
countries, U.S. generated a power vacuum that resulted in the increase in violence, 
created a new kind of authoritarianism and undermined the confidence in democracy 
building.
87
 Then what should replace democracy promotion as a major strategy?  
Although, the U.S. is still the most powerful country of the world, it has not 
limited resources and leverage, hence it has to set priorities. Security must be 
promoted in failing states and in dealing with rogue states without first 
democratizing the regimes involved. The priority must be security, because neither 
democracy nor economic development can be established or consolidated without 
basic security is provided. For Etzioni basic security refers to “conditions –both 
domestic and international- under which most people, most of the time, are able to 
go about their lives, venture onto the street, work, study and participate in public life 
(politics included) without acute fear of being killed or injured”.88 Security is 
usually considered as a legal-political right, but Etzioni draws an additional 
distinction between security and all the other legal-political rights. He connotes that 
“this step is necessary to enable me to formulate the proposition that on both 
principled and pragmatic grounds, the right to security is of highest order and its 
successful provision is more urgent than advancing other rights”. In circumstances 
under which a full spectrum of rights cannot be advanced simultaneously, a 
common situation, basic security must lead. Security first principle does not favor 
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“curtailing well-established freedoms for marginal gains in security in London, New 
York or Paris. But it does command first priority in places where people cannot 
walk streets, work, study or worship without fear of being bombed or kidnapped, 
tortured or maimed.”89 Moreover, Etzioni asserts that those people lacking basic 
security, are ready to make a deal between democracy and security. Under 
conflictual and insecure conditions people are not interested in the abstract concepts 
of democracy, such as voting power, right to assemble, freedom of speech. Only 
once security is established, and people became able to continue their daily lives, 
they start to look for their legal and political rights.  
After security is provided democratization would be gradually phased. 
Democracy cannot be fostered by force of arms. Forcing the rogue and failing states 
for regime change or liberalization might be more counterproductive and create anti-
American sentiments rather than to promote democracy and security. Etzioni 
connotes that “democracy cannot be imposed on gunpoint, most assuredly not on 
societies with little history that would prepare them for it, nations without a free 
press and civil liberties and without the institutions of a flourishing civil society”.90 
Therefore, policy makers should discard forceful democracy promotion as one of the 
strategic foreign policy tools for promoting security of the U.S. and the world. 
Etzioni asserts that the U.S. has highlighted issues regarding democratization and 
human rights rather than nuclear materials and arms in its dealings with Russia. 
However, Russian government might agree to much tighter controls on Russia‟s 
nuclear materials and arms if the proper incentives are offered; such controls add to 
the security of the government and have only small political costs. In contrast, rulers 
are unlikely to reverse the numerous undemocratic measures that were introduced 
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during their rule, because such moves might endanger their own power and regime. 
For Etzioni, “the leaders of Basra would be free to ban alcohol and fine those who 
do not obey, and even enact dress codes for women, but not to bomb liquor stores to 
assassinate Sunnis”.91 Further, he gives Libya as a small but effective example. 
After Libya gave up its support for terrorism and ceased its program for Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, the Bush Administration allowed Libya to emerge from isolation 
and sanctions, despite the fact that it has barely begun to reform its authoritarian 
regime. Such reforms can be promoted later as a second stage. Many elements of the 
existing regime should be kept in place, while considerable time should be allowed 
for new forces to grow. For Etzioni, if a rogue state deproliferates and stops 
supporting terrorism, its regime can be left intact in return and this would not mean 
that the West must engage in some kind of “Faustian bargain” and give up its 
“liberal soul to purchase security”. If the U.S. aims to democratize the world, most 
of the world would resists or not cooperate, if it aims to provide security for oneself 
and the entire world, the majority of the nations and citizens of the world will share 
this goal. Favoring democracy as public diplomacy might lead people across the 
world to question the support given by the U.S. to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
92
  
Additionally, security first understanding claims that it is not immoral to 
work with the religious, ethnic or tribal groups even though they follow illiberal and 
undemocratic policies. While dealing with autocratic countries in transition to 
democracy, U.S. can work with these illiberal groups given that they provide basic 
security, do not avoid democratization in the long term and contribute to the 
international counter-terrorism efforts. Etzioni use the term “illiberal moderates” 
referring to “those who disavow violence but who do not necessarily favor a liberal-
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democratic regime or full program of human rights.”93 According to Etzioni, 
illiberal moderates that are in between their opposition to many Western values and 
their rejection of violence are the most important group for U.S. foreign policy and 
for world peace.  
Another significant argument of the security first approach is that first basic 
security must be established, yet in the long run, security forces alone cannot 
maintain order; newly liberated societies require citizens with a strong set of shared 
ethics and moderate political opinions to legitimate the new order. For Etzioni, 
assuming that democratization and declarations of human rights will restore social 
order is a mistake. Law enforcement authority, backed by a moral culture, is the first 
step on the road to a stable and free social order. As security is established and 
democratization is pursued by peaceful means without external coercion, changes in 
the moral culture must also be pursued, because a society can function well as long 
as people do things with the belief that it is the right and just thing to do, not 
because of  the fear from the power of the authorities. In Etzioni‟s words:  
Security is not self-sustaining. Either it is undergirded by a police state, 
albeit at great human costs and with ongoing instability, or by a firm 
social fabric, which entails a shared moral culture, supported largely by 
informal social controls, in which law enforcement authorities are used 
mainly as a backup and a last resort… No state can field the number of 
law enforcement personnel needed to provide even basic security if 
most of the billions of interactions within the population must be 
surveyed and policed. And the law enforcement agents are likely 
themselves to violate the law, if they are not imbued with a sound moral 
culture.
94
 
 
Hence security and order should rely largely on moral culture that is 
promoted informally. In addition, promotion of the moral culture “cannot be 
separated from the quest for truly democratic regimes, because without a strong 
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moral culture neither political stability nor democratic liberalism can be 
established.”95 
 
2.3.5. Critics to Security First Approach 
Democracy is the answer. Not because democracy is perfect. It is 
precisely because it is imperfect. We are not looking for another utopia; 
we are looking for an optimal solution based on the systems available to 
us. By that standard, there is no contest… and there is no justification 
for further delay. For decades after independence, many of our populist 
regimes told us that democracy had to be suspended until “national 
liberation”; until Palestine had been liberated; until we have economic 
development; until we have true social justice; and so on. As it turns out 
now, after 50 years of depriving ourselves of democracy, we find 
ourselves with none of these things! And we‟re no closer to democracy.  
 
                  Saad Eddin Ibrahim
96
  
 
For Etzioni, security is the foundation on which all the other “good deeds” 
base on, hence first security should be provided. This does not mean that there 
should be a choice between good deeds, of course one naturally wants all good 
things together. Yet, if all of them cannot be provided at the same time, one of them 
must be prioritized. And it is the security. Etzioni is right in saying that if people 
cannot walk on the street safely, and all the time have the worry of being murdered 
than how can they think about their voting rights or freedom of expression. This is 
also valid in case of economic means. For an ordinary people having a job, earning 
enough money for perpetuating the conditions of a standard life, being able to send 
their children to school or hospital are more important than democracy and political 
rights which in daily life do not mean much to people. In a similar way Welzel and 
Inglehart state that everyone wants freedom and autonomy, but people‟s priorities 
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reflect their socio-economic conditions, and they therefore place the highest 
subjective value on their most pressing needs. Since material sustenance and 
physical security are the first requirements for survival, people assign them top 
priority under conditions of scarcity; with growing prosperity people become more 
likely to emphasize autonomy and self-expression values.
97
 
From this point of view democracy and human rights are seen as luxuries 
that can be delayed until security and order are provided. However, democracy, 
encompassing civil and political rights, democratic accountability and the rule of 
law, is not a luxury that can safely be postponed until order and security are 
restored; they are inseparable from the former. Thus one cannot really separate the 
need to rebuild structures of public security from the need to restore livelihoods and 
democracy. The latter in its turn requires the restoration of public order.
98
  They are 
both needed and one cannot be maintained at the expense of the other. Although 
Etzioni advocates the priority of the security over democracy promotion, he explains 
the inseparability of and the interaction between the two terms through his argument 
on the need for a moral culture. For Etzioni, the new order, maintained by security 
forces, should be legitimated through a set of shared values. A stable and free social 
order cannot be maintained unless law enforcement is supported by a moral culture. 
Besides, endorsement of the moral culture “cannot be separated from the quest for 
truly democratic regimes, because without a strong moral culture neither political 
stability nor democratic liberalism can be established.”99 Ish-Shalom touches upon 
this issue in his critic of security first approach:  
One cannot promise security first, not even for the sake of morality 
second. Security and morality do not form a lexical order of priorities. 
Being mutually constitutive implies a nonlexical association where not 
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only does security produce the perquisites for morality, but morality 
produces the prerequisites for security. Consequently, one is obliged and 
ought to strive for them both.
100
 
 
Actually it is not possible to prioritize a thing without downgrading another. 
But, it is a fact that security and democracy are two values that both are inevitably 
necessary for the people in the modern world system, and neither of them is an 
indulgence to be delayed until first the other is maintained. Prioritizing security and 
then expecting democracy to develop gradually and internally on the basic value of 
security might not work well. Those having the political power, labeled as 
government, rulers, statesmen, regime whatever, might use the urgency of the 
establishment of security for the sake of peoples‟ life in the short run, as an excuse 
to further limit the political and civil rights so that their power cannot be challenged. 
Etzioni‟s assumption regarding the triumph of democracy in time, after security 
maintained is questionable. What is the motivation for the ruling elite, having the 
political and economic power, to take the risk of losing that power by enacting 
political reforms, holding free and fair elections, advancing rule of law and making 
themselves accountable? Additionally, claim of security first understanding with 
regard to cooperating with illiberal but moderate groups, despite their undemocratic 
tendencies, for the security of the world – West and U.S. in particular – might 
provide them with international backing and strengthen their position in domestic 
politics regarding the priority of security and stability, which might result in the 
delay of democratization due to the security needs. Mahler connotes: 
Interestingly Etzioni seems as attentive of the basic security of foreign 
leaders as of the people they lead. As he sees it, there is ordinarily little 
to be gained by threatening foreign rulers with overthrow in an effort to 
change undesirable domestic or international behaviour… Respecting 
the security of repressive foreign leaders often can come at the expense 
of the basic security of individuals within their countries because the 
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most serious threat to a great many people‟s psychical security is from 
their own governments. Unfortunately, one cannot have it both ways: It 
is in many cases simply impossible to achieve basic security for 
individuals within a country without challenging the leaders who are 
oppressing them.
101
  
 
Etzioni holds up Libya as a model for the security first approach to dealing 
with rogue states, arguing that “the U.S. should renounce regime change in return 
for their renouncing the pursuit of nuclear weapons and support for terrorists, 
irrespective of their human rights records at home”.102 The fundamentality of the 
primacy of life gives Etzioni the rationale for morally and strategically tolerating 
those who reject political violence regardless of their political creed. The 
pragmatism of having relationship with illiberal moderates, despite their 
undemocratic policies at home, in the name of promoting international security, as a 
foreign policy strategy is obvious, yet its morality is dubious. As stated by Ish-
Shalom:  
Hypothetically the bar to being accepted into America‟s club, as it were, 
is a statist embrace of unconditional liberty. Etzioni argues for striving 
to mediate civilizational differences and foster alliances between 
moderates, namely those who settle disagreements by argumentation, 
rather than by resorting to violence. However in the moderate but 
illiberal states, dissidents and minorities, although respected, are not 
guaranteed political representation in decision making institutions.
103
   
 
Leaving the regime intact might mean that we are not concerned with the 
people living under that regime. Etzioni has right in arguing that dismantling the 
structures of the existing system creates a power vacuum, which might give way to 
further security and democracy problems. However, leaving the many elements of 
the old system intact in turn of some maneuvers of the regime to contribute to 
international security would not contribute the basic security of the citizens of the 
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concerned country. What is the contribution of Libya‟s abandoning of the pursuit of 
WMDs programme on the basic security of Libyans? Etzioni does not deal with this 
issue. Moreover, U.S. and European powers took Libya out of the list of rogue states 
after stopping its pursuit of nuclear arms and reestablished their diplomatic relations 
with Libya. The regime could use this diplomatic backing for legitimizing its 
security policies at domestic level.
104
 When Etzioni gives the Russian example, he 
says that government of Russia might agree to much tighter controls on Russia‟s 
nuclear materials and arms if the right incentives are offered because such controls 
add to the security of the government and have only small political costs.
105
 
However, repealing the undemocratic measures that were introduced during their 
rule would be costly, because such moves might jeopardize the power of the regime. 
Under these conditions, is it rationale to expect the ruling elites of the moderate but 
illiberal states to realize democratic reforms for guaranteeing political representation 
to opponents and making themselves accountable after they maintained security 
without any external pressure, since opposition groups, civil society and media do 
not have enough power to pressurize the government internally?  
Another paradoxical point of Etzioni‟s approach is his use of Weber‟s 
definition of state, “an entity that has a legal monopoly on the use of force”.106 For 
him only state has this right. He argues for basic security, consisting internal and 
international conditions under which most people, most of the time, are able to go 
about their lives, venture onto the street, work, study and participate in public life, 
including politics, without acute fear of being killed or injured, yet he accepts the 
state as the only agent of security. Since state is the only entity that can maintain 
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security, the security of people become dependent on the security of the state. This 
understanding might result in the essentialization of the security of state over other 
endeavors, including the security of citizens and democracy, as emphasized by those 
studies criticizing the state-centric security understanding. In such a situation, 
maintenance of security would not generate the conditions for democracy to 
consolidate.  
 
2.4. Conclusion  
Democracy and security are both difficult concepts to define because they tend to 
mean different things to different people at different times. Although the 
relationship between security and democracy is studied from different angles, it is 
possible to say that there is not sufficient scholarly attention on the relationship 
between the two concepts, especially the impact of the former on the latter. Some 
scholars of comparative politics see democracy and democratization as a way to 
provide security, others emphasize the potential of democratization process to lead 
instability and conflict, whereas society-centric security studies pay attention to the 
negative impact of state and military-centric security understanding on democracy 
and security of citizens.    
Democratic peace theory claims that there is a negative relationship between 
the level of democracy between two states and their likelihood of fighting each 
other. Several theorists have also extended the democratic peace thesis to argue that 
a democratic peace is evident within intrastate conflicts as well. It has been reasoned 
that democracy reduces the likelihood of discrimination and of political repression. 
However, Henderson points out, “the democratic peace proposition has not been 
explicitly tested with reference to third world post colonial states, where most civil 
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wars take place”.107 He also shows that in democracies as in authoritarian systems, 
the relative degree of freedom that the individual enjoys may increase or decrease 
depending on the level of threat perceived by the state. There would appear to be an 
inverse relationship between security and democracy. Some scholars emphasize the 
instability impact of the democratization process. Huntington states as the rates of 
social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high and the rates 
of political organization and institutionalization are low, the result is political 
instability and disorder. Mansfield and Synder argue that the instability of 
democratic transitions increases the likelihood that democratizing states will initiate 
international conflict. Meanwhile Daxecker, Galbreath, Ward&Gleditsch and 
Goldsmith‟s works conclude that large change to democracy reduces the likelihood 
of conflict for the post World War II period, while uneven transitions or democratic 
reversals, increase conflict propensities. While scholars of comparative politics, 
discuss the impact of democratization on security or stability, scholars of society-
centric security explore the effects of state and military-centric security 
understanding on democracy. Arguing that in state and military-centric security 
understanding, people are called upon to give priority to state/national security and 
thus to consent to sacrifice of any value that will provide more security, society-
centered studies underline that sometimes the activities of state, especially in 
developing countries, become the major impediment for the consolidation of 
democracy and the main source of insecurity for citizens.  
 Security first approach as a current contribution to the literature, presents 
security as the precondition of democracy. Etzioni developed security first approach 
because of the need for a change in American foreign policy considering the 
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unsuccessful attempts for forceful democratization in Afghanistan and Iraq. He 
mainly asserts that rather than trying to establish democracy or to change the regime 
in failed and rogue states, first attempt must be in the direction of the maintenance 
of basic security. He asserts priority to security by taking into account the 
inconvenient conditions in the concerned countries for democracy and insufficiency 
of resources. As the most powerful state of the world, U.S. does not have limited 
sources. Hence, building structures of security and democracy might not be possible 
simultaneously. Moreover, under conditions where people face the risk of being 
attacked or murdered any time and lacking the minimum standards of living, 
democracy promotion would not work. Therefore, first security must be established 
so that people can go on with their daily lives without worry and become able to 
think about their political and civil rights. However, this does not mean disregarding 
democracy at all. Democracy would evolve gradually in accordance with internal 
circumstances.  
Security first approach assumes that inherent limits of resources and the 
difficulty of concurrent maintenance of security and democracy lead rulers, even the 
rulers of the most powerful state of the world, to make a prioritization between 
needs. Since the pressure of resource scarcity is higher in developing world, rulers 
of these countries have to set priorities in accordance with the available resources. In 
case of the need to security and democracy, priority is given to security because its 
maintenance provides the foundation for other rights to be developed. Drawing upon 
this understanding, security first approach postulates that after security is established 
democracy will gradually be consolidated. Here it is also assumed that the rulers, 
having political and economic power, will perform democratization at the expense 
of their power, once security is provided. Does resource scarcity really force rulers 
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to make prioritization, or urgency issue is a kind of mechanism that is used by those 
having power in order to keep the agenda as they incline, so that they do not lose 
power, and whether they enact political reforms for consolidating democracy at the 
expense of their power or will security concerns keep their urgency? The accuracy 
of these two assumptions will be analyzed in the following chapters on Singapore 
and Azerbaijan, as developing countries adopted security first approach. 
As touched upon by many scholars, developing countries have to deal with 
political and economic development concurrently with maintenance of security and 
democracy as well. Most probably, they become independent having an 
authoritarian legacy, without having experience with democracy, political 
institutions and security structures of themselves. This difficulty is furthered by the 
different demands of the groups newly joined to the political arena after the 
independence and the launch of democratization process. Here the scarcity of 
available institutions and tools to meet these demands and the anxiety of the ruling 
elites about losing their power affects their perception of threat.  In addition to the 
internal and external context and availability of sources, the policy capacity and 
legitimacy of the rule have effect on how challenges and threats are perceived and 
policies are formulated. Thus, not just the context and resources but perception of 
threats is significant for the prioritization of security. The perception of the different 
demands as a challenge to their rule by the elites might resort them to prioritize 
stability and security and to restrict the political arena -maybe through repression- in 
the name of maintaining stability and security, mainly the security of the state and 
their rule. Here, security is not only prioritized but its maintenance become possible 
through constraining democratization process. The result is the prioritization of 
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security at the expense of democracy. The accurateness of this argument will also be 
analyzed in the following parts. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
  
THE CASE OF SINGAPORE 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
I reject the notion that all men yearned for democratic freedoms, prizing 
free speech and the vote over other needs such as economic 
development… Notions of absolute rights to freedom for individuals 
would sometimes have to be compromised in order to help maintain 
public order and security. 
                                                                                                    Lee Kuan Yew
108
  
Singapore gained its independence from the British Empire in 1963 and joined 
the Malaysia Federation, and became totally independent in 1965 after its separation 
from the Federation. Established during the Cold War, Singaporean state was part of 
developing world that is in need of both political and economic development and 
security. As the rulers of a newly sovereign state, Singaporean elites have pursued 
security-centered policies. It is an interesting case, because it provides a chance to 
study security first approach on a developing country and answer the questions 
regarding the objective and subjective dimensions of the emergence and 
continuation of such an understanding, and influence of this understanding on the 
democratization process. 
This chapter aims to understand the causes that gave way to the prioritization 
of security and impact of the security first understanding on the process of 
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democratization in Singapore, as a developing and modernizing country. Here the 
assumptions of security first approach -priorities should be clarified in line with 
available resources, U.S. should work with those not liberal but against use of 
violence and terror and democracy would develop after security is maintained- will 
be verified on the case of Singapore. The chapter composes three parts. In the first 
part political history and political system of the country are explained briefly to give 
general information about the country. In the second part the context and the causes 
–objective and subjective- that gave way to the prioritization of security are 
discussed to understand whether just the internal and external context and 
availability of sources are significant for the prioritization of security or the 
perception of challenges and threats by the ruling elites. In the third part, 
implications of security first understanding on democratization process are explored 
to understand whether maintenance of security and cooperation of Western powers 
with illiberal but moderate regimes provide the necessary conditions for democracy 
to develop gradually. 
 
3.2. Political History and the Political System 
Singapore passed into the control of the British Empire in the late nineteenth century 
and became a significant commercial harbour.  In 1924 Straits Settlements (the 
Malayan Union), consisting of Singapore, Malacca and Penang, was formed under 
the government of Bengal. After the Second World War the Malayan Union 
proposal was ended and the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore were 
established in 1946. The British government allowed Singapore to hold its first 
general election, in 1955, which was won by the Labour Front under the leadership 
of David Marshall. Demanding complete self-rule, then Chief Minister Marshall led 
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a delegation to London, but was refused by the British government. He resigned 
upon return, and was replaced by Lim Yew Hock, whose policies then convinced 
the British Empire. Singapore was granted full internal self-government with its own 
prime minister and cabinet overseeing all matters of government except defence and 
foreign affairs.
109
 
Elections were then held on 30 May 1959 with the People's Action Party 
winning a landslide victory. Singapore eventually became a self-governing state 
within the British Empire on 3 June 1959 and Lee Kuan Yew was sworn in as the 
first prime minister of Singapore.  In August 1963, Singapore declared 
independence from Britain unilaterally, and joined the Federation of Malaysia in 
September along with Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak as the result of the 1962 Merger 
Referendum of Singapore. Yet this merger did not last long. Singapore left the 
federation in 1965, following the heated ideological conflict between the state's PAP 
government and the federal Kuala Lumpur government, and became independent on 
August 9, 1965 by its separation from the Federation of Malaysian.
110
  
PAP has held the overwhelming majority of seats in parliament since 1966, 
when the opposition Barisan Sosialis Party
111
 refused to take part in 1968 elections. 
The decline of the Barisan was obvious following its boycott of Parliament. The 
competitive multi-party phase ended in 1968. The ineffectiveness of other political 
parties led to the basis for a de facto one party dominant system and left the PAP as 
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the sole representative party till 1981. Since 1981, opposition parties have been 
represented in the parliament, yet PAP continues to be the governing party.
112
 PAP 
was headed by Lee Kuan Yew from independence through 1990s, currently his son 
Lee Hsien Loong leads the party.
113
 
The political system of Singapore is parliamentary republic, whereby the 
Prime Minister of Singapore is the head of government, and of a single-party 
system. Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is 
vested in both the government and the Parliament of Singapore. The legislature is 
the parliament, which consists of the president as its head and a single chamber 
whose members are elected by popular vote. The role of the president as the head of 
state has been ceremonial.  
 
3.3. The Context that Gave way to Prioritization of Security  
Singaporean government has adopted security first approach under certain internal 
and external circumstances that gave way to the prioritization of security and 
stability. Trying to establish independence with the experience of security-centered 
system of the colonial rule, Cold War environment in which Western powers have 
put premium on security and stability of the country and the regime due to their 
strategic and economic interests, concurrent need to political and economic 
development and security building and multiethnic structure of the society created a 
context that led rulers to perform security-centered policies. Moreover, successful 
economic development and lack of political opposition strengthened the ruling 
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elite‟s position with regard to security first approach, while Asian values debate 
provided the moral base of this understanding.  
 
3.3.1. Legacy of Colonialism  
It is argued that the colonial system in Singapore, even its most benevolent phases, 
had been highly authoritarian and put security and stability to the centre.
114
 
Singapore has retained and enhanced various illiberal laws, including provisions 
allowing detention without trial, a licensing system for press, discretionary 
registration of societies, from the colonial administration and nurtured a post-
colonial culture that held stability and efficiency to be central, and many principles 
of democracy, peripheral.
115
   
 
3.3.2. Cold War Environment 
Singapore‟s authoritarian regime is argued to be largely the product of the Cold 
War. The island was an essential element of Western defence in the region and “a 
buttress against the fall of the dominoes”. Both the U.S. and Britain supported rise 
of Singapore‟s state power and promoted the country as an ideal model of Third 
World economic and political development, where “a strong and enlightened 
government provided the necessary political stability for industrialization”.116  From 
the perspective of the U.S. and West, establishment of security and order was 
important to provide a stable environment for foreign investments, which in turn 
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was significant for economic development. And economic development played a 
key role in avoiding the progress of communism in the region.  
Yun-han claims that “the bipolar peace of East Asia reflects the ability of 
China and the U.S. to dominate local powers in their respective spheres”.117 The 
U.S. and West with their strategic interests in mind, were slow or even reluctant to 
exercise their political and economic power to promote democratic change among 
their security allies during the Cold War years and they tolerated authoritarian 
regimes to sustain key Cold War security partners.
118
 
 
3.3.3. Urgency of Survival 
Survival argument is largely used by the Singaporean government for persuading 
people in the need of security and political stability as the most important 
requirements of economic development, which is the only trajectory for survival. 
After its sudden expulsion from Malaysia, the survival of Singapore as an 
independent state became the dominating concern affecting almost all the 
government policies. The situation was particularly tense in the 1960s when 
Indonesia was pursuing its policy of confrontation against Malaysia and 
Singapore.
119
 This sense of vulnerability further heightened by geostrategic realities 
of the country: a tiny, predominantly Chinese island state with larger Malay 
neighbours and lacking natural resources. This situation increased the country‟s 
dependency on external world for its livelihood.
120
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Singh states that for Singapore, a strong economy is more vital than military 
security for its survival. Yet, security and stability have underpinned Singapore‟s 
economic success.
121
 Given the dependency on foreign investment, political stability 
is the key to the country‟s economic future. Singapore has provided a secure 
environment for locals and foreigners and gained investors‟ confidence.122 
Significance of the political stability in the continued economic growth of the island 
and its attraction as an investment and business centre also emphasized by Deputy 
Prime Minister Wong: “Every society needs order to prosper and that even though 
some foreigners and Singaporeans complained about lack of freedom in Singapore, 
the country‟s safety draws foreigners there”.123 
  
3.3.4. Multiethnic Society 
Modern Singapore has argued to be shaped by ethnic riots, which fostered a 
premium on order and strong government. Singapore has a multi-ethnic composition 
of the population, with ethnic Chinese (%75) predominating, followed by ethnic 
Malays (%14) and ethnic Indians (%8).
124
 Singapore‟s expulsion from Malaysian 
federation in 1965, together with its ethically diverse population divided by race, 
religion and language in addition to its tiny size, has given its leaders an acute sense 
of vulnerability, which they believe can be compensated for only through discipline 
and order.
125
 
 
3.3.5. Asian Values 
                                                 
121
 Bilveer Singh, 2008, “Singapore Success at Home, Challenges from Abroad”, Southeast Asian 
Affairs, pp. 315, 317 
122
 Paul, 1992, “Obstacles to Democratization in Singapore”, pp. 4-7 
123
 Quoted in Kuok, 2008, “The Lodestar for US Foreign Policy In Southeast Asia?”, p. 1412 
124
 Means, 1996, “Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore”, p. 103 
125
 George, 2007, “Consolidating Authoritarian Rule: Calibrated Coercion in Singapore”, p. 132 
 54 
The state of Singapore uses the concept of Asian democracy that tend to place 
greater emphasis on common good rather than individual good.
126
 Asian 
democracy, quite unlike liberal democracy, is argued to produce the good life 
and a wholesome society, economic and social progress and a political and 
social system that is consistent with the values and traditions of newly 
industrialized countries of East and Southeast Asia.
127
 Individualism and more 
generally Western culture, is viewed as polluting, descendant and a threat to the 
island‟s economic feature. Confucian values instill the discipline necessary for 
people to work together towards the common good.
128
 The positive concepts of 
collective interests and collective responsibility, basing on Asian values, against 
negative concepts of individualism and liberalism are used by elites to support 
the survival ideology which requires stability and hard working. 
 
3.3.6. Lack of Opposition  
It is also vital to note that the absence of a credible opposition party throughout 
much of Singapore‟s history has allowed the PAP to adopt a security first approach 
without worrying too much about having to balance this against political 
expediencies.
129
   
The major opposition Barisan Sosialis Party boycotted 1968 elections and 
became inactive then. The incompetence of other political parties led PAP to hold 
all the seats in parliament between 1968-1981 and the overwhelming majority of 
seats since 1981.
130
 Absence of opposition enabled the PAP to establish its 
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institutional and ideological hegemony which holds up to today. It was able to 
stimulate the population behind its ideology of economic pragmatism; that is 
“resolute drive for economic development as the only strategy for Singapore‟s 
survival as a nation”.131  
 
3.3.7. Successful Economic Development 
With increasing attention paid to economic issues after independence and success on 
the economic front, the PAP leadership was able to mobilize the nation towards the 
stated goals of progress and prosperity. The economic transformation has been 
achieved mostly by the large-scale foreign investment, the inflow of which has 
become possible due to the safe and politically stable environment.
132
 It is argued 
that whereas security in Singapore has nurtured rapid increases in GDP, economic 
development has promoted social stability and further security in turn.
133
 Increasing 
wealth and industrialization tend to raise the income of workers and to expand the 
size of the middle class, thereby giving more people a stake in the existing 
socioeconomic order.
134
 The successful economic development of the island and 
rising living standards have helped strengthen the power of the state and support for 
its security centered policies.
135
 
Security first approach was adopted in Singapore within a certain framework 
shaped by external and internal factors. Experiencing a security-centered colonial 
rule and the Cold War, a system based on security of the state, maintenance of 
bipolarity and containment policies, led people to perceive security as the major 
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attribute and made it easier for rulers to pursue security first approach. Furthermore, 
the geographical realities of the island and economic difficulties increased the sense 
of vulnerability, a problem that was believed to be solved through rapid economic 
growth and development. Yet, it is interesting that the need to economic development 
was presented as a survival issue and took its place as the major security concern. In 
addition the solution for development was also based on security, because 
development was argued to be preceded by security. Former Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew purported that “I believe what a country needs to develop is discipline 
more than democracy. The exuberance of democracy leads to indiscipline and 
disorderly conduct, which are inimical to development.”136 Security is not only 
shown as a precondition for development, but a premium is put on security over 
democracy. In this process, not only the context, vulnerabilities of the country and 
difficulties but the threat perception of rulers have had significant effect. Rising 
openness and increasing political and social demands of different groups due to the 
democratization has been perceived as a threat to the stability and economic 
development of the country and the durability of the existing rule by the ruling elites.  
Since democratization has been perceived as a destabilizing process and thus a 
challenge for the security of the country and the regime by the ruling elites, they have 
rather preferred to retard democratization through use of some restraining measures 
in political and civil life.  
 
3.4. Prioritization of Security at the Expense of Democracy 
Leaders of Singapore portrayed the security world in “dark Hobbesian-like terms” 
and thus, the newly independent Singapore adopted the “pugnacious image of a 
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poison shrimp, small not invulnerable but certainly no pushover”.137 This led to a 
strong emphasis on building a credible military deterrent, which was evidenced by 
the introduction of national service for all young males, after Singapore‟s separation 
from the Malaysian Federation. Within a short period of time, a full-fledged citizens‟ 
army; Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) have been formed.
138
 Singapore has not 
faced an obvious territorial aggression from any of its neighbours since its 
confrontation with Indonesia in the late 1960s. However the concern of the PAP 
government over the security of the country has not been reduced. Government 
constantly reminded the public the fragility of order. Even in the national education 
programs, interconnectedness of security to survival and success of the country is 
consistently appealed.
139
 
Leaders saw the SAF strictly as a military or hard-security deterrent that 
complemented other soft-security deterrents. Other than the armed forces, the “Total 
Defence” strategy also emphasized the restructuring and empowering civil 
management and oversight agencies. Total defence strategy base on the belief that 
Singapore can survive a war only if the entire society, not just military, is prepared 
and ready for defence. It encompasses physiological (citizen's commitment to the 
nation and confidence in the future of the country), economic (economy‟s resistance 
against crisis and war situations), civil (civil management in cases of emergency) and 
social (harmony in multiracial society) defence.
140
 Therefore, total defence has 
shaped not only the security sector in the country but also other sectors as well. 
Moreover, self-reliance in defence is argued to be sought not only for self-esteem and 
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prestige but also for the concern that unless the government was able to demonstrate 
its ability to defend itself against potential enemies, it would not be able to inspire the 
confidence of foreign investors.
141
  
In the case of Singapore, security has been understood as state and military-
centric, including country‟s capability in defending its values and the internal 
stability that enables the necessary environment for the realization of the core 
interests, foremost of which is survival. In this understanding, stability and order 
have been presented as more important than civil rights and citizens‟ security. Since 
the party integrated with the state, security of the state covers the security of the PAP. 
It can be argued that the PAP government‟s security concerns in the name of survival 
might conceivably influence the ways problems are perceived and policies are 
formulated. Nevertheless, to maintain a stable environment for foreign investment, 
not only the political opposition but also civil society was pressurized, ethnic groups 
and media were controlled and working and middle classes were reclaimed through 
the incorporation into the state. While elections and economic development were 
presented as bases of legitimacy of the PAP rule, Asian values and meritocracy 
arguments used to prioritize social order over individual rights.  
 
3.5. Implications of Security First Understanding on Democracy  
The leaders of PAP successfully convinced Singaporeans of the urgency of the 
survival issue. The argument about the total dependence of the island to foreign 
investment was emphasized by the rulers, basing on country‟s smallness and lack of 
natural resources. A safe and politically stable environment was the precondition of 
being attractive for foreign investors. According to this argument PAP would be a 
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good government, providing stability and security and promoting employment.
142
 
However, security first understanding gave way to the formulation of undemocratic 
policies and degradation of political and civil rights. Alan Chong argues that 
Singapore‟s bureaucrats are driven by the survival ideology and public political 
culture became nationalized into this ideology through two measures: 
First, the ordinary citizen civic groups, trade unions and other cultural 
associations were encouraged to identify with a para-political grassroots 
network both to provide feedback and ideas for government policies. 
Second, there was effective political communication on communitarian 
solidarity through the commercially consolidated pro-government local 
media.
143
  
 
3.5.1. Political Restrictions in the Name of Survival 
To maintain a stable environment for trade and foreign investment, political 
opposition and social behaviour were coerced by the threat of anti-disorder 
legislation, as well as legal proceedings, to avoid activities such as strikes, riots, 
mass protest, street crime and excessive individualism.
144
 This helped to maintain a 
stable polity within which development-friendly polices could be implemented 
which, in turn, won the party the popular mandate it needed to rule with a firm 
hand.
145
 George purports that “Singapore‟s political stability belies important shifts 
in coercive strategy, which may help to account for the endurance of the PAP. Part 
of the PAP‟s success formula has been its ability to choose the right tools of 
repression for the right job”.146 
Another example to the political restrictions in the name of survival is that 
due to the crisis with Malaysia on 1963-65, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew asked 
                                                 
142
 Seah Chee Meow, 1984, “Political Change and Continuity in Singapore”, p. 240 
143
 Chong, 2004, “Singaporean Foreign Policy and The Asian Values Debate…”, p. 99 
144
 Chong, 2004, “Singaporean Foreign Policy and The Asian Values Debate…”, p. 99 
145
 Heng Hiang Khng, 1997, “Economic Development and Political Change…”,  p. 118 
146
 Cherian George, 2007, “Consolidating Authoritarian Rule: Calibrated Coercion in Singapore”, 
The Pacific Review, 20 (2), p. 128  
 60 
Singaporeans to give the PAP a sweeping mandate for strong and decisive rule 
unencumbered by a parliamentary opposition or public debate over contentious 
issues. Gordon Means claims that by this way parliamentary institutions provided 
the legitimatizing rituals for the exercise of the authoritarian rule. “Thus the PAP, 
which clamored for democracy and human rights when it was founded in 1954 had 
by the 1970s become the champion of authoritarian powers and institutions inherited 
from colonialism.”147  
 
3.5.2. Restrictions on Ethnic Groups and Languages  
Faced with serious ethnic riots in July and September 1964 and ethnic clashes in 
1969 following the outbreak of riots in Malaysia after its general election, the 
government of Singapore chose to place priority on achieving security over the 
rights and freedoms of ethnic groups. Every Singaporean or permanent resident is 
required to have an ethnicity. The government encourages community self-help 
organizations, in which community is drawn around the boundaries of the three 
official races and in dealing with sensitive, ethnically related matters, relies on 
ethnic leaders for feedback and advice, holding regular consultations with them. 
Every Singaporean or permanent resident is required to have an ethnicity. The 
state‟s policy of using ethnicity as a primary label of social identification and as the 
main form of socio-cultural classification furthers the authoritarian culture and 
social character of the country.
148
  
According to Hiang Khng, the government‟s sense of vulnerability against 
ideological threat of communism was enhanced by the emotional pull that a 
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Marxist-ruled China had on Chinese Singaporeans, particularly students in the 
Chinese-language secondary schools. This problem was further complicated by “a 
resentful mood among this Chinese-educated community that they were being 
marginalized in a society which was run by English-speaking elite who were, at 
best, indifferent and at worst, hostile to the needs of Chinese education in 
Singapore”. In order to neutralize such an allegation of disruptive forces the PAP 
where necessary, made use of authoritarian methods, such as the discretionary 
detention of political opponents and imposing a strict censorship regime on the 
media and other means of public expression.
149
 While in 1959, a small group of 
English-speaking Singaporeans were lectured upon, in 1984 nearly all schools have 
voluntarily become English-medium schools. The emphasis on the importance of 
the English language by the government together with the concern of economic 
interest by the parents has resulted in a drastic switch of student enrolment from the 
vernacular schools to English schools.
150
  
Laothamatas states that the PAP government succeeds in deterring 
opposition efforts from destabilizing its rule and interfering in the Singaporean 
political system because it has well demonstrated to the “ethnic Chinese that it, and 
only it could safeguard their interest in a sea of Malayness which is their 
neighbouring countries.  On the other hand, it has shown to the ethnic Malays that it 
is always prepared to move resolutely to control the ethnic Chinese chauvinistic 
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demands on language and culture at their cost”.151 To break the political power of 
Malays, the PAP government introduced ethnic quotas in public estates in 1989. By 
this way it ensured that Malays would not form a majority in any constituencies and 
could not affect the victory of PAP in elections.
152
 
 
3.5.3. Restrictions on Civil Society and Media 
Singapore is characterized by a centralized power structure and a closed and elitist 
policy-making structure dominated by the PAP. The PAP regime permits no 
opposition from interest groups outside the parliament and presides over control of 
local media and the regulation of foreign news publications. Accountability 
administered through civil society organizations is something that the PAP is 
especially averse to. As the PAP sees it, it is through the institutions of parliament 
and elections that democratic accountability is enacted.
153
 Political debate is 
channeled through government-control agencies or officially registered political 
parties, though these do not have the same opportunities as the ruling party. 
Seriously anti-democratic legislations which constraint the political sphere are in 
place. Singapore‟s Internal Security Act upholds a series of constraints on civil 
activities while the Societies Act requires regularly meeting groups of more than ten 
people to register formally with the Registrar of Societies, moreover prohibits such 
registered organizations to engage in most forms of political activity.
154
 Singapore‟s 
civil society is further circumscribed by so-called out-of-bound markers on political 
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commentary and activity. Government steers civil movements into its own group of 
state-related organizations. This forms part of a wider trend of the PAP absorbing 
greater segments of domestic society to identify and associate with itself. 
155
  
The PAP regime aims to extend political control beyond the institutional and 
non-institutional forms, through the positive concepts of collective interests and 
collective responsibility, basing on Asian values, against negative concepts of 
individualism and liberalism.
156
 By this way civil society is reduced to one of which 
is defined and determined by the competition of rights between individuals and all 
state interventions are justified as preemptive actions for ensuring collective well-
being and measures of good government rather than abuses of individual rights.
157
 
Strict laws, privileging societal over individual (or group) rights, such as the Internal 
Security Act (ISA) and Miscellaneous Offences Rules (MOR) strictly enforced. ISA, 
initially introduced to combat communism and then justified on the basis that 
Singapore does not have laws to deal with racial or religious extremism, allows for a 
person to be detained without trial. MOR require a permit to be taken out for any 
public assembly or procession of five or more persons in any public place on the 
basis that a large group of people who gather for a peaceful purpose can turn 
violent.
158
 
Singapore is also criticized for the suppression of media freedom, 
defamation suits to silence critics and curbs on public assembly. Newspapers are 
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privately owned but the selection of editors, the sale of shares, and the appointment 
of boards of directors all require government approval.
159
 The control of the media 
is less visible and therefore harder to pin down. Censorship in Singapore is 
exercised more by informal advice and such a law ensures that the advice is taken 
seriously.
160
 Government uses financial penalties and restrictions rather than direct 
censorship, to control the foreign media, including journalists and political 
commentators. PAP leaders have used libel suits against critics in both the domestic 
opposition and the foreign press.
161
 According to Lee Kuan Yew, “[f]reedom of the 
press, freedom of the news media, must be subordinated to the overriding needs of 
Singapore and to the primacy of purpose of an elected government”. The Singapore 
government has allowed the press just enough autonomy to preserve a modicum of 
credibility, and through the regulatory restrictions and commercial constraints 
creates a self-censorship system.
162
 
 
3.5.4. Incorporation of Working and Middle Classes into the State  
The domestic economy is controlled by government linked companies and statutory 
authorities, and this made many Singaporeans, directly or indirectly, dependent on 
the state for access to housing, employment, business contracts and personal 
savings. Given its structural power to either reward or punish citizens, the capacity 
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of the ruling party for political cooption has also been strengthened.
163
 Government 
is the largest employer of labour. People think in terms of social obligations rather 
than just their individual rights when faced with issues of participation and decision 
making. Hence, fear plays an important role in both the working and middle classes‟ 
relationship with the state.
164
 Furthermore, potential personal costs are weighed 
against the relatively good material life that Singaporeans continue to enjoy under 
the PAP regime. Thus the middle class is cooperative with the regime than against 
it.
165
 
With independent labour having been controlled, this form of state 
capitalism has comprehensively undermined other alternative potential bases of 
power outside the state by either domestic business or middle classes. The outcome 
is not just weakened formal political opponents but also a near elimination of civil 
society. To the extent that civil society exists at all, its actors are extremely 
fragmented and lacking the capacity for collective action.
166
 Incorporation of the 
working and middle classes into the state, through various forms of social and 
economic dependence on the state, created political vulnerability on domestic 
business and citizens and affected the nature of independent social bases from which 
political movements can draw.
167
 
 
3.5.5. Hindering Opposition  
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The PAP, governing the country since independence, was supposed to be mass-
based, multiracial and democratic political party, consisting of both nationalists and 
communists, with the sole objective of ending colonial rule. It was a marriage in 
1954 of temporary political convenience, born out of the struggle for independence. 
On the one hand it compromised the well-organized leftist and nationalist grassroots 
organizations. On the other hand it involved English-educated middle class 
nationalists such as Lee Kuan Yew. The executive of the PAP was for the time 
being largely controlled by Lee Kuan Yew‟s faction that exploited this advantage to 
reform the party structure to further centralize power in their hands before the 1959 
election for self-government and to intimidate their opponents.
168
 The counter-
democratic trends are argued to emerge soon after the initial flourish of post 
independence pluralism. The leaders of the PAP understood that some form of 
electoral mandate was needed for the legitimacy to govern. Yet for them good 
governance was defined more by its efficiency at solving problems rather than 
democratic requirements of checks and balances.
169
 In its drive for absolute political 
dominance, PAP used many undemocratic policies to suppress opposition. Among 
these were detention without trial, deregistration and replacement of radical unions 
with compliant ones, withdrawal of license from newspapers deemed to be opposed 
to national interests, political re-education of civil servants to reduce the 
independence of the civil service and bind it to the government‟s agenda.170 Choo 
purports that the need to control has been fundamental to PAP‟s political culture 
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since independence, including regulating many aspects of social life, and naturally 
the government is reluctant to change the foundations of this system.
171
 
According to Hiang Khng, for an individual, being a political opposition can 
be a risky activity in Singapore where the state is pervasive in every sphere of social 
life. It is possible to say that one‟s livelihood is directly or indirectly tied to the 
functions of some state agencies. Besides, in its determination to stay in power, the 
PAP keeps a close watch on the activities and words of members of opposition 
parties. Recent political history contains several instances of members of opposition 
parties being successfully prosecuted for violating tax laws or sued by PAP leaders 
for defamation.
172
 Under the PAP, Singapore‟s governance has been highly 
successful in terms of securing peace, security and economic success. However the 
PAP government is viewed as being rather intolerant of political criticism and with 
the exception of the period prior to and during elections, as restricting the space for 
the organized political opposition.
173
 Although general elections have been held 
every four or five years, the PAP has continuously occupied nearly every 
parliamentary seat. Those who run or vote for parties other than the PAP are 
discouraged, disadvantaged and punished in variety of ways: the jailing and 
bankrupting of opposition leaders; the engineered sacking of critical commentators; 
the withholding of state funds from opposition wards and the redrawing of their 
boundaries; the manipulation of election schedules to deprive the opposition of time 
to campaign; the restriction of political debate of officially registered parties; the 
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placement of ambiguous limits on any form of public discourse; the curtailing of 
media coverage of opposition parties and so on.
174
 
 
3.5.6. Use of Elections as the Base of the Legitimacy  
The fundamental basis of PAP‟s claim to be democratic is that it has always 
captured state power through elections not otherwise.
175
 It won all of the seats in an 
expanding parliament in the general elections of 1968, 1972, 1976 and 1980 against 
a handful of inconsequential opposition parties and gave way to a de facto one-party 
parliamentary system. PAP's share of the popular vote in contested seats declined 
from 78% in 1980 to 65% in 1997. However, the elections of 2001 saw the party's 
share of the popular vote climb to 75%. Singapore general election, 2006 marked 
the first time since 1988 the PAP did not return to power on nomination day, with 
the opposition parties fielding candidates in over half of the constituencies.
176
 
Joshua B. Jeyaretnam of the Workers' Party became the first alternative party 
member of parliament in fifteen years (last time Barisan Sosialis Party represented 
in the parliament between 1966-1968) when he won a 1981 by-election. Despite 
getting an increasing percentage of the popular vote, 34% overall in 2006, 
alternative parties gained small numbers of seats in the general elections. The 
opposition parties attribute the disproportionate results to the nature of the group 
representation constituency (GRC) electoral system.
177
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Rodan depicts Singapore as a “façade electoral regime” where electoral 
institutions exit but yield no meaningful contestation for power. Elections are argued 
to be retained and viewed as functional for the purposes of political legitimacy.
178
 
Their retention also reflected the specific historical circumstances out of which the 
party came to power, a process in which the PAP championed the case for free 
elections. Although the PAP‟s English-educated middle class leaders have weaken 
political pluralism, they have insisted, especially to international audiences, that 
electoral competition is free and fair.
179
 The PAP has drawn upon the legitimating 
power of elections; however coercion remains one of the pillars of PAP dominance. 
George claims that “[t]he array of repressive tools at the government‟s disposal 
remains large. What has changed in time is the manner in which those tools are 
used. There has been a shift from more spectacular punishments, such as 
imprisonment, towards more behind-the-scenes controls”.180  
 
3.5.7. Economic Development as the Other Base of Legitimacy  
The successful economic development of the island and rising living standards have 
helped strengthen the power of the state and the legitimacy of the party.
181
 The case 
of Singapore according to Laothamatas, shows that economic success does not 
automatically or easily usher in a democratic era. On the contrary, a booming 
economy and happy workers probably created the most suitable condition for the 
PAP to intensify its strategy for depoliticizing society. Efficiency and effectiveness 
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were central values for PAP, not democratic principles.
182
 Singapore‟s case is 
employed by those defending the need to postpone the introduction of liberal 
democracy until sustained economic growth has been achieved and security 
prevails.
183
 
The PAP recognized early that without substantial improvements in the 
social and economic conditions of Singaporeans no amount of repression or 
ideological rhetoric could guarantee power. According to Deputy Prime Minister 
Tong, liberal democracy would result in the destabilization of the island‟s political 
system and therefore threaten the country‟s economic viability.184 The PAP 
government had promoted the idea of a trade-off between political liberty and 
economic and social development. Expansive social and economic roles by the state 
included major public investments in education and public housing.
185
 Increasing 
wealth and industrialization tend to raise the income of workers and to expand the 
size of the middle class, thereby giving more people a stake in the existing 
socioeconomic order.
186
 The trade-off for the majority is improved material life for 
some losses in civil and political liberties. 
 
3.5.8. Meritocracy Principle  
Lee Kuan Yew‟s one of the statements in 1971, shows the importance of 
meritocracy in the PAP ideology: 
Singapore is a meritocracy. And these men have risen to the top by their 
own merit, hard work, and high performance. Together they are a closely-
knit and coordinated hard core. If all 300 were to crash in one jumbo jet, 
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then Singapore would disintegrate. That shows how small the base is for 
our leadership in politics, economic and security. We have to, and we will, 
enlarge this base, enlarging the number of key digits.
187
  
 
The PAP insists that the employment of cohesive and similarly endowed elites 
is what secures good governance and economic and social prosperity. For Paul, in 
Singapore there is a social contract wherein the “people put their trust in those who 
know better because they are better educated and have proven their competence; in 
return people gain good governance, protection, high living standards and political 
stability”.188 The ideology of meritocracy bases on the idea that rewards are dealt 
out according to merit rather than ethnic membership, and this provides the general 
framework of equality.
189
 However, it is argued that “political accountability reform 
agendas involving institutional check and balances on power are an anathema to a 
deeply held PAP ideological conviction central to its justification of one-party state: 
the myth of meritocracy.”190  
 
3.6. Some Opening Up  
Due to the decrease in the PAP votes in 1984 and 1991 elections, the PAP 
government has become more responsive to popular demands. It introduced the 
“Nominated MP” scheme in which selected individuals are appointed rather than 
elected, to parliament as independent voices. A “Feedback Unit” has been instituted 
to organize regular closed-door policy discussions with invited individuals. Yet all 
these openings were limited. The government had responded to these civil society 
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activities in ways that it hopes will not jeopardize its continuing legitimacy.
191
 These 
new institutions are argued to been developed for promoting non-democratic notions 
of representation and permitting very selective types of conflict into the political 
process.
192
 According to Hiang Khng, the regime‟s response to this political 
challenge has been a change of governing style which places more emphasis on 
consultation with and feedback from the electorate than it used to. However, another 
equally important component of this political renovation effort was the use of the 
party‟s considerable experience and power to pre-empt and control dissidence so 
that they do not undermine the fundamentals of a dominant party system.
193
 The 
PAP government has regarded maintenance of this dominance as a condition for the 
good economic performance that is crucial for its legitimacy. This is parallel to an 
ideology that whatever features the system takes on by way of liberalization and 
concessions to opponents would have to be within its limiting framework.
194
 Rodan 
claims that through such opening up it is not the political space of civil society but 
that of the PAP state that is expanding. “Ironically, even if political participation is 
on the increase, political pluralism is not. New forms of political participation 
exclude collective, independent attempts to challenge the PAP.”195  
Hence, commitment to democracy has been in the minimalist procedural way 
of holding elections and giving concessions to dissidents in order to legitimize the 
regime. In addition, a kind of “custodial approach towards lifestyle and culture” (for 
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example, banning of certain pop songs and long hair) also signaled a limited 
acceptance of democratic rights such as freedom of expression.
196
  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
Singaporean government has adopted security first approach after it gained 
independence, during the Cold War, as a small island state, with a multiracial society 
and without natural resources. The primacy of the need for security and stability has 
kept a rather authoritarian government in place and although Singaporean society is 
opening up to accommodate more rights associated with liberal democracy, this has 
not been allowed to occur at the expense of security.
197
 The political culture of 
Singapore is argued to became “a subject culture” because of the strong belief in the 
importance of stability for the sake of ensuring survival.
198
 
Singapore‟s vulnerability as a small territory lacking of natural resources 
compared to its relatively larger neighbors in Southeast Asia and its total dependency 
on the external world for its livelihood provided the politicians a good reason in 
convincing Singaporeans of the urgency of the survival issue.
199
 Through the sense of 
vulnerability and survival ideology the necessity for the country to an effective 
defence capability has been highlighted. From the point of the PAP government, in 
order “to survive in an unfriendly world, a small, weak and exposed Singapore must 
become robust, rugged and self-reliant, especially in its defence capability”.200 
Dependency on foreign investment has kept the significance of security and social 
stability.  Singaporean politicians provide a safe home for locals and foreigners, 
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without which Singapore would easily lose investors‟ confidence.201 The survival 
ideology has also been heightened due to the security-centered conjecture of the Cold 
War system, which presents military security of the state as the most important value. 
Besides, for the U.S., Singapore‟s economic and political development was “a 
bastion against communism‟s progress in Southeast Asia”.202  
Therefore, it is possible to argue that both the domestic and international 
juncture supported the adoption of security first approach. The Singaporean elites 
evolved their survival ideology on economic prosperity assumption. Rapid economic 
development and growth, which were dependent upon foreign investment, were 
presented as the only way of surviving. And for attracting foreigners there was need 
to a socially and politically stable environment in addition to an effective defence 
capability. In Singapore, the survival mentality encompasses not only military and 
economic sectors but also all other sections of life, because the total defence strategy 
includes physiological, societal and civil defence in addition to economic and 
military defence. Furthermore, significance of the survival issue has been kept on the 
public agenda through the use of media and the education programs, although the 
country has not faced a real threat or aggression from its neighbours. Asian values, 
emphasizing common good and order rather than individual rights, was utilized as the 
moral base of survival ideology. Lack of effective opposition and the successful 
economic development have further strengthened the PAP government‟s position 
regarding prioritizing security and survival issues. The internal and external context 
that gave way to the prioritization of security have at the same time resulted in the 
increase of PAP‟s power and control over all sectors. Yong explains gradual 
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enhancement of the PAP dominance over Singaporean political, economic and social 
life: 
With virtually no credible political opposition since the eclipse of the 
Barisan Socialis in the late 1960s, the PAP‟s grip on political power in 
Singapore has been total and absolute. This political dominance has 
been enabled the PAP government to consolidate its control over every 
aspect of state and society in Singapore. Over the years, with its 
emphasis on economic development the PAP government moved to 
depoliticize Singapore by moving political debate form political arena 
into the bureaucracy and systematically building an administrative state. 
Under these conditions, civil servants began playing an increasingly 
dominant role in managing state and society. Indeed, the integration 
between political leadership and civil service was such that the latter 
became the principal recruiting ground for political leadership.
203
 
 
As argued by Hiang Khng, a democratization exercise involves renegotiating 
a new contract of power between a governing regime and the governed. This 
renegotiating process requires changes to what constitutes legitimacy in the status 
quo. In the case of Singapore, “the requisite changes should be likened more to a 
renovation rather than a redefinition of the notion of legitimacy altogether”. 
Economic performance continues to be the primary element of the PAP‟s 
legitimacy.
204
 With rapid economic growth and the expansion of high living 
standards, people from different segments of the society have stake in the status quo. 
They accord the government what Means calls “performance legitimacy”, issues of 
the regime‟s commitment to democracy or to civil and human rights receive little 
attention from the citizens.
205
  
The PAP born out of the struggle for independence as a pluralist party, 
consisting people from different segments of society, having different political views, 
with different races. However, the undemocratic policies emerged soon after the post 
independence pluralism. The section leaded by Lee Kuan Yew changed the party 
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structure to centralize power in their hands just before the 1959 election and started to 
limit the power of their opponents.
206
 The leaders of the PAP was aware of the need 
for the legitimacy to govern, although for them good governance was defined more 
by its effectiveness at solving problems rather than checks and balances. It used 
regular elections as a way of providing legitimacy, but the most crucial factor to the 
success of PAP government is the rapid economic development and its positive 
impact on the peoples‟ life. PAP presented political stability as the pre-condition for 
future economic growth and development, which is the only way to survival. As 
suggested by the Asian values debate, it has put premium on common good and order 
over liberty and democracy, and through economic development, it has managed to 
incorporate the different segments of the society to the system. Moreover the strong-
handed PAP government, enjoying to a certain extent legitimacy has controlled the 
political challenge with its effective measures designed to restrain its political 
opponents.
207
  
The causes that gave way to the prioritization of security were utilized by the 
PAP government to set its dominance over all segments of life in Singapore and to 
prolong this dominance. PAP has developed a system in which rules and conventions 
constrained the growth of both the opposition parties and civil society. In this system, 
PAP‟s approach is to democratize to a level where it is not politically destabilizing. It 
is predictable that PAP will continue to set a political agenda that ensures its political 
dominance because no political party can be expected to let its own decline in power. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 THE CASE OF AZERBAIJAN 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
Azerbaijan gained its independence in 1991 by the collapse of the Soviet Union. At 
the time, the arguments regarding the victory of the liberal democracy and 
democratization of the states in the post-Soviet arena rose high. The turmoil caused 
by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, heightened by the outbreak of military 
conflicts both between and within the states in the Soviet geography. The 
establishment of Azerbaijani independence was accompanied with the disastrous 
developments of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Upper-Karabakh. 
Azerbaijani state faced the challenge of securing a place while trying to develop 
democracy. Facing the double challenges of security and democratization, ruling 
elites of Azerbaijan have pursued security-centered policies. It is an interesting case, 
because it provides a chance to study security first approach on a developing 
country and answer the questions regarding the objective and subjective dimensions 
of the emergence and continuation of such an understanding, and influence of this 
understanding on the democratization process. 
This chapter aims to understand the causes that gave way to the prioritization 
of security and impact of the security first understanding on the process of 
democratization in Azerbaijan, as a developing and modernizing country. Here the 
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assumptions of security first approach -priorities should be clarified in line with 
available resources, U.S. should work with those not liberal but against use of 
violence and terror and democracy would develop after security is maintained- will 
be verified on the case of Azerbaijan. The chapter composes three parts. In the first 
part, political history and political system of the country are explained briefly to 
give general information about the case. In the second part, the context and the 
causes –objective and subjective- that gave way to the prioritization of security are 
discussed to understand whether just the internal and external context and 
availability of sources are significant for the prioritization of security or the 
perception of challenges and threats by the ruling elites. In the third part, 
implications of security first understanding on democratization process are explored 
to understand whether maintenance of security and cooperation of Western powers 
with illiberal but moderate regimes provide the necessary conditions for democracy 
to develop gradually. 
 
4.2. Political History and the Political System  
Azerbaijan, having a brief period of independence between 1918-1920, regained its 
independence from the former Soviet Union on August 30, 1991, with Ayaz 
Mutalibov, former First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, becoming 
the country's first President. Becoming independent under less than ideal and orderly 
conditions, Azerbaijan was entangled in a devastating war with Armenia over 
Upper-Karabakh. With the onset of full-scale armed hostilities, “a pattern was 
established whereby governments in Baku rose or fell as a result of developments on 
the battlefield.”208 Following a massacre of Azerbaijanis at Khojali in Karabakh in 
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March 1992, Mutalibov resigned and the country experienced a period of political 
instability. The old guard returned Mutalibov to power in May 1992, but less than a 
week later his efforts to suspend scheduled presidential elections and ban all 
political activity prompted the opposition Popular Front Party (PFP) to organize a 
resistance movement and take power. Among its reforms, the PFP dissolved the 
predominantly Communist Supreme Soviet and transferred its functions to the fifty 
member upper house of the legislature, the National Council.
209
 
Elections on June 7, 1992 resulted in the selection of PFP leader Ebulfez 
Elçibey as the country's second president. Elçibey‟s government is widely credited 
with having laid the basis for democracy in the country. However, his government 
was incapable of either credibly prosecuting the Upper-Karabakh conflict or 
managing the economy, moreover many PFP officials came to be perceived as 
incompetent. Growing discontent resulted in June 1993 in an armed insurrection, 
leaded by Colonel Surat Husseninov in Ganja. The rebels advanced on Baku facing 
any opposition. As a result, President Elçibey fled to his native province of 
Nakhchivan. The National Council gave presidential powers to its new Speaker, 
Heydar Aliyev, former First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party (1969-
81) and later a member of the Soviet Union Politburo, and Soviet Union Deputy 
Prime Minister (until 1987). Elçibey was formally deposed by a national referendum 
in August 1993, and Aliyev was elected to a five year term as president in October 
with only symbolic opposition.
210
 Aliyev preserved the state of emergency instituted 
under Elçibey, mass demonstrations, marches and meetings were prohibited, and the 
media were subject to strict censorship. The Karabakh conflict was becoming an 
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obstacle to stable development in Azerbaijan. Yet by early 1993 events on the 
battlefield were pointing to stalemate. Attempts to advance brought devastating 
losses to both sides. Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement in May 
1994. The freezing of armed hostilities allowed Azerbaijan to return to a semblance 
of political normality. The state of emergency was abolished and political activity 
resumed.
211
 
In 1994, Surat Huseynov, by that time the prime minister, attempted a 
military coup against Heydar Aliyev, Huseynov was arrested and charged with 
treason. In 1995, another coup attempt against Aliyev, by the commander of the 
military police, Rovshan Javadov, was averted, resulting in the killing of Javadov 
and dispersing of Azerbaijan's military police. By 1997, Heydar Aliyev was credited 
both domestically and internationally, with having restored order, succeeded in 
attracting numerous foreign oil companies to the country, improved Azerbaijan‟s 
standing in world affairs and created the foundation of a modern army with 
Turkey‟s help.212 He won re-election to another five year term in 1998. His power 
has consolidated over the country and his New Azerbaijan Party (NAP), has enjoyed 
a comfortable majority in the parliament. In the October 2003 presidential elections, 
İlham Aliyev, son of Heydar Aliyev and the premier, was elected as the president.213 
He was reelected for a second term in 2008 presidential elections.   
The political system of Azerbaijan is presidential republic. Executive power 
is exercised by the president, the government and the national council, whose 
members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the national assembly. 
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President is the chief of the state and elected by popular vote to a five year term 
(eligible for continues terms). Prime minister is the head of the government. 
Legislative power is vested in the national assembly (Milli Mejlis) whose members 
are elected by popular vote to serve five year terms. 
 
4.3. The Context that Gave way to Prioritization of Security  
Whereas the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the emergence of many 
independent states, it also caused chaos in the post-Soviet sphere, especially in 
Caucasus, that was experienced through military conflict between states, civil wars 
and changes of governments through military coups. Azerbaijan became 
independent, while it was dealing with the military conflict with Armenia, as a result 
the security concerns and military issues became the top priority of the rulers and 
the society.
214
 Azerbaijani government has adopted security first approach under 
certain internal and external circumstances that gave way to the prioritization of 
security and stability. Karabahk conflict has been the major factor of the adoption of 
security first approach in Azerbaijan. In addition, the seventy years of Soviet rule, 
the need to stability for economic development and the international actors interests 
in the region – trying to take the country under their own sphere of influence, 
reaching the energy resources and securing the energy routes - created a context that 
led rulers to keep the security and stability concerns on the agenda and perform 
security-centered policies.  
 
4.3.1. Historical Legacy  
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While the Soviet legacy left behind an ethnicized bureaucracy in the South 
Caucasus, it did not help to develop an institutional framework for popular political 
participation, because there was no legacy of pluralistic party politics, competitive 
elections, meaningful parliamentary representations or professional journalism.
215
 
Importance of the security of the state and the maintenance of the system and order 
was the top priority. Besides mentality of the society, which was largely determined 
by seventy years of Soviet regime, was not used to the new conditions. The notions 
of democracy such as freedom of speech, human rights, distribution of powers and 
the system of checks and balances were foreign to the society.
216
  
 
4.3.2. Karabakh Conflict 
The “no peace no war” condition between Azerbaijan and Armenia had a 
devastating impact on all aspects of life. The conflict became an all encompassing, 
overwhelming issue. Society‟s interest in the war was enormous and a greater part 
of national newspapers was dedicated to the military theme. National security 
concerns and responding to the immediate needs of a million refugees and the 
internally displaced population absorbed most available resources.
217
  
Azerbaijan had not its own army or military specialists during the Soviet 
rule, and the military infrastructure developed during Soviet times was rapidly 
destroyed, following the collapse of the Union. The significance of the military 
capability was realized by the outbreak of the military conflict with Armenia. 
Moreover, the patriotic feelings that came to fore by the independence after the long 
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period of Soviet dominance, further rose because of the war, and society became 
ready to make many sacrifices in the name of liberating the invaded territories.
218
 
 
4.3.3. Need to Stability for Economic Development 
Azerbaijan, like all the other ex-Soviet republics, faced economic difficulties just 
after gaining independence. Since its whole economy dependent upon the command 
economy of the Soviet system, the collapse of the Union disbanded the Azebaijani 
economy. The continuous military conflict with Armenia and flow of refugees from 
the invaded lands to other cities of Azerbaijan further complicated the economic 
difficulties. The major source of Azerbaijani economy has been energy resources, 
however it did not its own infrastructure to extract and export the oil and the natural 
gas. This made Azerbaijani economy dependent upon the foreign investment, which 
required a stable environment and predictability.
219
 The flow of foreign investment 
was presented as the only way of economic prosperity and Kuwait‟s success was 
used as a remarkable example. Between 1994 and 1998, the Aliyev regime was 
rightly associated with political and economic stability, which was Azerbaijan‟s 
clear priority at the time.
 220
 
 
4.3.4. Foreign Interest  
Oil means large investments which require stability. In September 1994, Azerbaijan 
signed “the contract of the century” to explore three offshore fields with the BP-led 
oil consortium, and it made Western countries, led by the U.S., interested in the 
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stability of the region.
221
 They had increasing economic interests in the Caucasian 
region, a potentially lucrative and attractive place for foreign direct investment, 
especially for multinational oil companies. Therefore, conflict resolution should be 
regarded as a prerequisite for securing energy export routes. Internal political 
stability is another precondition for the development of energy and infrastructure 
projects, both of which are vital for the region.
222
 As with oil, geopolitical and 
strategic considerations give outside powers an incentive to place stability and 
security first in their dealings with Azerbaijan.
223
  
Security first approach was adopted in Azerbaijan within a certain framework 
shaped by external and internal factors. Experiencing a security-centered Soviet rule 
and trying to establish independence during a war with its neighbour led people to 
perceive security as the major attribute and made it easier for rulers to pursue security 
first approach. Furthermore, the situation of the refugees and the displaced persons 
and economic difficulties increased the sense of vulnerability, a problem that was 
believed to be solved through economic development, dependent on foreign 
investment that requires stability. The need to economic development, hence to 
foreign investment has been linked to security concerns. Security and stability are not 
only shown as necessary conditions for political and economic development, but a 
premium is put on security over democracy. In this process, not only the context, 
vulnerabilities of the country and difficulties faced by people, but the threat 
perception of rulers have had significant effect. Rising openness and increasing 
political and social demands of different groups due to the democratization has been 
perceived as a threat to the success in the battlefield, stability and economic 
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development of the country by the rulers. Moreover, the frequent change of 
governments in subsequent two years challenged the durability of the rule and led a 
critical worry at the side of ruling elites.  Democratization has been perceived as a 
destabilizing process. Instability on the other hand has been seen as a contributor to 
the failure at Karabakh conflict and delay in the economic development, in addition 
to the being a challenge to the longevity of the regime by the ruling elites. This led 
rulers to retard democratization through use of some restraining measures in political 
and civil life. 
 
4.4. Prioritization of Security at the Expense of Democracy 
The influx of one million refugees from the invaded cities and infrastructural 
damage caused by the war had a very harsh impact on the society and the economy 
of Azerbaijan. The region‟s chronic instability discouraged foreign investors from 
doing business there and made the task of building pipelines to carry Caspian Sea oil 
and gas to markets much more difficult. The nationalist upsurge accompanying the 
conflicts prevented the development of an ideologically defined political system. 
The conflicts complicated the democratization process and the building of civil 
society and served as excuses for undemocratic rule. The ceasefire with Armenia 
provided order and stability to the country. This stability, however came “at the 
expense of halting the ambitious process of democratization initiated in 1992. For a 
overwhelming majority of the population, stability was a more urgent concern than 
democracy”.224  
In the case of Azerbaijan, security has been understood as state and military-
centric, mainly the country‟s ability to defend and rescue its invaded territories. 
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Here internal stability has been the enabling factor, both for military success and 
political and economic development. In this understanding, stability and security of 
the state have been presented as more important than peoples‟ security and 
democracy. Since stability contributes to the durability of the existing rule, it also 
adds to the security of the regime. 
 
4.5. Implications of Security First Understanding on Democracy 
The 1992 elections, resulted in the selection of Elçibey as the country's second 
president, is argued to be the one of the freest elections in the post-Soviet sphere. 
Despite the war, Azerbaijan under PFP developed in a clearly democratic direction. 
Elçibey‟s government is widely credited with having laid the basis for democracy in 
the country.
225
 At the beginning of the Aliyev regime, a significant progress was 
made not only in political and economic stability, but also in democratization 
process. Significant legislative reform prepared the ground for elections, press 
censorship was abolished and opposition media functioned, although with difficulty. 
However, in time the hopes regarding democratization come to an end.  As Cornell 
puts it, “[w]hile Aliyev‟s advent to power has brought stability to Azerbaijan, it also 
put an end to the country‟s first democratic experiment.”226  
Heydar Aliyev came to power, after the fled of Elçibey because of an armed 
insurrection, and faced two military coup attempts in 1994 and 1995. Feeling 
threatened, the Aliyev regime responded by intensifying its drive toward the 
centralization of power. “With power at the center unrestrained by internal checks 
and balances, Azerbaijan all too readily became a „superpresidential regime‟ in 
which the ruler and a tiny elite around him monopolized political power and 
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national resources.”227 While Karabakh Conflict has been used for domestic politics 
to criticize the opponents and keep stability and security concerns on the agenda, 
military expenditure has been raised rapidly at the expense of social projects, civil 
society and media has been restricted in the name of survival, elections have been 
controlled and even rigged by the authorities. In addition, the premium on stability 
and security over democracy has been consolidated because of the U.S. and other 
Western countries interest in the security of energy sources and routes. Moreover, 
the inherent clientelistic relations within the Azerbaijani society and fragmented 
opposition have made it easier to follow security-centered policies. 
 
4.5.1. Use of Karabakh Conflict for Internal Politics 
The continuous military conflict had an immense impact on peoples‟ life and the 
need to stability for both political and economic requirements overshadowed 
concerns for democratization and political rights. The Karabakh issue, however, has 
remained on both the regime‟s and opposition‟s agenda, after the signature of the 
ceasefire agreement in 1994. It has been mostly used for internal political problems. 
The conflict was exploited by the authorities to justify harsh measures repressing 
protest at the conduct of the elections. The regime consistently invoked the need for 
social stability, claiming that Azerbaijan‟s defeat in the war had been due to 
domestic turmoil.
228
 Aliyev regimes used the defeat at war to discredit the former 
government, now the opposition. It is also used to distract attention from rule of law, 
human rights and democracy issues the state of which are under international 
observance and criticism. The conflict has been, and still is, used by political elites 
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as a pretext to limit the rights and freedoms of citizens and delay much needed 
political and economic reform.
229
 
The opposition, on the other hand, has presented the Karabakh Conflict as a 
failure of Aliyev regime. The opposition in Azerbaijan has been less compromise 
oriented on this issue than the government and has pushed for increased military and 
political pressure on Armenia.
230
 İlham Aliyev‟s lower levels of legitimacy 
compared to his father forced him to adopt a more hard-line position in this issue. 
Aggressive statements about a readiness to resort to force to liberate the occupied 
territories have been accompanied by a rise in the number of ceasefire violations 
along the line of contact. Since the current leadership owes its rise to power to 
“skilful manipulation of popular protest over the handling of the Karabakh issue, 
and to loud pledges to resolve the conflict quickly and without losses to the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, a retreat from this position would 
be dangerous and potentially threatening to government‟s legitimacy.” 231 
Political parties and elites
232
 have sought to use the consistent preoccupation 
of public opinion with the Karabakh issue to their own advantage. Opinion polls 
focusing on the factors behind continued Azeri-Armenian enmity show the 
consciousness of public about this exploitation. 34.1 per cent of respondents cited 
that the deployment of the Karabakh issue by internal political forces in their 
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struggle for power, while 35.4 per cent cited that the interest of competing world 
and regional powers have in prolonging the conflict, a factor consistently 
emphasized in the media.
 233
 
 
4.5.2. Rapid Increase in Military Expenditure  
When the war was outbreak with Armenia, Azerbaijan had not its own army or 
military specialists. Therefore the military sector was dealt by volunteers. Yet, by 
1997 a modern army was founded by the support of Turkey.
234
 However, the 
unresolved Karabakh Conflict and the priority of security concerns led tremendous 
militarization and substantial increase in military expenditure in the last few years. 
This factor has diverted the government from investing more in institutional 
capacity, education and social issues, infrastructure and renovation.
235
 Military 
expenditure in Azerbaijan has increased by 554 percent in real terms between 1998-
2007. The increase was particularly high in 2006, when spending more than 
doubled.
236
 In December 2005 a presidential decree created a ministry for the 
defence industry responsible for military production and in 2007 the military budget 
rose to 1.1 billion Dollars as President İlham Aliyev pledged to make it equal to 
Armenia‟s entire budget.237 Azerbaijan‟s first National Security Concept, signed by 
Aliyev on May 24, 2008, emphasizes the need to improve the country‟s defensive 
capabilities in order to better respond to separatism and regional conflicts.
238
 
                                                 
233
 Musabayov, 2005,  “The Karabakh Conflict and Democratization in Azerbaijan” 
234
 Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, 17.04.2009, “Azerbaycan ve Türkiye Askeri İlişkileri”(The Military 
Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey), Azerbaycan Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi(Azerbaijan 
StrategicResearch Center) 
235
 Mkrtchyan, “Democratization and the Conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh”, p. 7 
236
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008, SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185-188 
237
 International Crisis Group, 14.11.2007, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War”, ICG Europe Report, 
No. 187, p. 12 
238
 H. Kaan Nazlı, 2007, Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2007-Azerbaijan, Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers 
 90 
Azerbaijan staged a major military line in late June 2008, at which Aliyev stated that 
“we should ready to liberate our territories by military force at any moment.”239 
 
4.5.3. Distorted Elections 
It is argued that the consolidation of Heydar Aliyev‟s power over the country and 
majority of NAP in the parliament became possible in a series of disputed elections, 
marred by serious irregularities, including ballot-rigging.
240
 Leila Alieva claims that 
most of the members of Azerbaijan's 1995 parliament, the first parliament, was 
selected rather than elected, and thus it enjoyed little confidence among the 
people.
241
 
Just before the 2003 presidential elections, the constitution was changed 
through thirty nine amendments, and endorsed at a referendum at the end of 2002. 
The most important amendment is the one that made the premier next in line to the 
president. Previously the speaker of parliament stood next in line. Local politicians 
construed that this was done to make it possible for the son of the 80-year old 
Heydar Aliyev, İlham Aliyev to succeed his father, who was admitted to a Turkish 
hospital on July 8, 2003 because of heart problems.
242
  In August, 2003, İlham 
Aliyev was appointed as premier by the president. Though Artur Rasizade, who had 
been prime minister since 1996, continued to fulfill the duties of that office so that 
İlham Aliyev could concentrate on his presidential election bid. In the October 2003 
presidential elections, İlham Aliyev was announced winner while international 
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observers reported several electoral irregularities.
243
 He was sworn in as president at 
the end of the month, and Rasizade became premier again.  
The 125-member unicameral parliament was elected in November 2005 in an 
election that showed significant improvements in democratic processes, but did not 
meet international requirements of free and fair election. Electoral irregularities, 
regarding the organization of public debate, the conduct of polling and the counting 
of votes, reported by International Election Observation Mission.
244
 Changes to the 
election law, some in line with proposals of Venice Commission (an advisory body 
of the Council of Europe), were approved by the legislature in June 2005, including 
those making it easier for people to become candidates for the November 6, 2005, 
parliamentary election. However, the deputies rejected some of the most significant 
proposals, including a more equitable representation of political interests on 
electoral commissions. During the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary election, 
authorities, those opposed President İlham Aliyev‟s policies, arrested several 
prominent officials on charges of coup-plotting. One sensational trial involved 
Ferhad Aliyev (no relationship to İlham Aliyev), former minister of economic 
development, his brother Refik Aliyev, president of state energy company, and Ali 
İnsanov, former Health Minister. They were convicted on charges of fraud to ten 
years in prison. Opposition journalist Elmar Huseinov was murdered on March 2, 
2005, and criminals have not been apprehended yet.
245
 
Some other changes were made to electoral code in June 2008 before the 
presidential election on October. However the mostly criticized regulations were not 
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changed, such as the dominance of government representatives on election 
commissions and the four week campaign period.
246
 The mainstream opposition 
parties, such as Musavat, the Popular Front, and the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, 
have boycotted the elections. They have motivated this with the absence of adequate 
campaigning opportunities for them, the domination of the election commissions by 
representatives of the authorities, an absence of reforms in the election code, and 
unfavorable conditions in the local media. This is not the first time that the 
opposition parties are boycotting either the election process, or elections results. In 
the 1998 presidential elections, most opposition parties, stayed out of the election 
process for similar reasons. Similarly, some opposition parties boycotted the results 
of the Parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005 and preferred staying outside 
Parliament to using their seats to voice the problems of their voters.
247
  
On March 2009, Azerbaijani people voted in a referendum by which more 
than forty amendments to the constitution were approved. One of the amendments 
removed some of the restraints on the presidency to confiscate constitutional ban on 
one person serving more than two consecutive presidential terms. By this way, it 
became possible for İlham Aliyev, elected president in 2003 and 2008 presidential 
elections, to run for a third term in 2013.
248
 
 
4.5.4. Restrictions on Civil Society and Media 
In Azerbaijan, freedom of association is recognized and protected by the 
Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. While grassroots 
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activity continues to flourish, the Aliyev administration exerts a dominating 
influence on civil society organizations, especially those critical of government‟s 
democratic shortcomings. NGOs face registration, tax and funding problems. Local 
financial support to NGOs is limited. Similarly freedom of speech, support for 
media, access to information and protection of journalists‟ rights are recognized by 
law, yet media sector encounters numerous obstacles conducting its work and 
maintaining independence. Azerbaijan was ranked in 2007 among the top five 
countries in the world in terms of the number of imprisoned journalists.
249
 Charges 
are generally for defamation or inciting ethnic and religious hatred and promoting 
terrorism. President Aliyev amnestied five journalists in December 2007, yet several 
others remained imprisoned. The breakup of public protests by use of force is 
common.
250
 Excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators remains as a 
serious problem. Large anti-Aliyev rallies in Baku and other cities, just after 2003 
presidential election, were met by physical brutality and arrest.
251
 The ministry of 
interior has often been used to undermine political opposition by discrediting, 
intimidating or prosecuting political parties and journalists. Newspapers linked to 
opposition parties have been persecuted and face considerable financial pressure.
252
 
The government consistently harasses independent civil society groups, especially 
through lawsuits, such as the punitive libel cases against Leyla Yunus, a leading 
human rights activist, and Intigam Aliyev, president of the Legal Education 
Society.
253
 There are opposition parties, civil society organizations and semi-free 
press outlets in Azerbaijan. However, “these loci of democracy, pluralism and 
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openness are allowed to the extent that they do not threat the regime‟s existence”. 
To make their systems live longer, political elites do not hesitate to manipulate the 
election process, manage media flows, and impede the strengthening of political 
institutions.
254
 
 
4.5.5. West’s Support to Undemocratic Rule for Energy Interests 
By signing the oil contract in 1994, Heydar Aliyev gave the West a huge stake in the 
development of hydrocarbon resources and increased Western countries‟, led by the 
U.S., interest in the stability of the country. By this way, Aliyev ensured his 
government of extensive Western capital and diplomatic backing.
255
 Major Western 
oil companies have invested billions of Dollars in developing Azerbaijani oil and 
natural gas fields and export pipelines. In order to receive the recompense of these 
investments, there is need to stability. As Guliyev states, “Western governments‟ 
interest in Caspian oil meant they would support whoever ensures that precious 
stability. Moreover, since all oil contracts had to be negotiated with the president, 
foreign companies and Western governments courted the chief executive, giving 
him a great deal of external and domestic legitimacy.”256 So the greater the oil 
reserves the more tolerant are Western governments in overlooking undemocratic 
policies of Azerbaijani regime.
257
 
Upon the critics of some human rights and other observers about the undue 
support of the U.S. to nondemocratic leader of Azerbaijan, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Bryza stated in June 2006 that “just because Azerbaijan has not gone as 
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far as we would like on democracy does not mean we are going to ignore our 
energy, counter terrorism and military interests.”258 
Foreign criticism was decidedly muted and it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that this was largely due to commercial energy interests and looking for 
strategic advantage in the region.
259
 2003 presidential election fell far short of 
international norms. The international community, eager for stability and continuity 
in the oil-rich state, offered only soft criticism until it was too late to affect anything. 
The international response to the events surrounding the election and widespread 
evidence of fraud and human rights abuses made clear that many in the West place a 
premium on political stability and energy investment.
260
 The stability of the 
Caucasus, necessary to keep the transport of Caspian oil and gas uninterrupted, is 
even more essential to world markets and strategic interests. In addition to energy 
needs, the Caucasus region is the crucial link between Central Asia and Europe; 
therefore its political stability and economic development is important to U.S. 
national security interests. The Caucasus countries are becoming more important 
security allies in the U.S. led campaign against terrorism.
261
 David Holly asks, 
“How hard should Washington push for democratic change at the risk of alienating a 
government it sees as a geopolitical partner, an ally in fighting terrorism and a force 
promoting key Western oil interest?”262 
With İlham Aliyev cooperating with the U.S. and Europe in areas such as 
security, counterterrorism and energy, Western policy makers felt little desire to see 
power change hands in Baku. “Azerbaijan showed that if the democratic world 
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allows other interests to divert it from taking a firm stand on behalf of democratic 
principles in a transitional state where resolute authoritarians remain players, 
beleaguered prodemocratic locals cannot be expected to take up the slack.”263 It is 
claimed that the oil industry is profit-motivated above all else and that this goes a 
long way to explaining the fact that work for democracy and human rights in set 
aside when Western oil companies get involved in Azerbaijan. Western investors 
are, moreover, convinced that they need to stay on good terms with Aliyev to do 
business. It seems that with this end in view “the dictatorship is unhesitatingly 
accepted, and even supported.”264 
It also important to note that Aliyev regimes‟ dominance and undemocratic 
policies have been possible due to the structure of the society and the political 
system in Azerbaijan. Personal, family and clan relations and struggles and 
competition between these families and clans are an inherent part of Azerbaijani 
society.
265
 
 
4.5.6. Clientelistic Relations  
Azerbaijan‟s ruling elite is argued to be increasingly divided with several clans, 
largely organized around regional (Nakhichevanis and Yerazi) and patronage 
relationships, competing for control of a pyramidal distribution structure. Political 
institutions are closely linked to clan structures and the ruling elite.
266
 A substantial 
number of people depend on patronage from İlham Aliyev for their privileged 
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position and have a vested interest in retaining the regime in power.
267
 That is the 
main reason for Aliyev‟s and his New Azerbaijan Party‟s strong support among the 
new Azerbaijani‟s. Another social group with entrenched interest in preserving the 
Aliyev regime is “the clientelistic network of favoritism that is tangling the country 
at all levels of government, as well as business and educational establishments, and 
even in many non-governmental organizations.”268 The ruling New Azerbaijan Party 
was established in Nakhichevan by Heydar Aliyev in 1991. It is argued to be 
managed much like a Soviet communist party; membership is a precondition for 
state employment. Many high ranking NAP officials, served under Heydar Aliyev 
during his duty as communist party chief in the 1970s, are close Aliyev relatives. 
Around Aliyev family, power is tightly held by a small group that exploits its 
administrative positions.
269
 
Furthermore, oil and gas exports have provided the governments‟ with 
significant economic convenience and contributed to regime stability, allowing the 
government, through patronage, public spending and rent-seeking, to get public 
support and to keep the society unorganized.
270
 Examples vary from spending petro 
dollars on expanding the public sector to wasteful spending on popular and highly 
visible projects to financing mega-infrastructural projects across the country.
271
 
 
4.5.7. Fragmented Opposition 
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The opposition in Azerbaijan is divided. Its largest parties are heirs to the 
nationalists who briefly held power between 1918-1920.
272
 A special feature of 
Azerbaijani politics became the formation of parties around the personalities of 
leaders, rather than programs or ideologies. For example, in the run-up to the 
October 2003 elections, three chief opposition leaders emerged. In addition, loyalty 
to the ruler is motivated not because of his representing an ideology, or any 
charismatic qualities, but due to a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators.
 
273
 
The ceasefire with Armenia allowed Heydar Aliyev to tighten his control of 
the state administration. He dispensed with prime minister and Ganja coup leader 
Suret Huseynov. An uprising of the special police force, led by Karabakh veteran 
and Deputy Minister of the Interior Colonel Rovshan Javadov, was put down, and 
Aliyev ensured that opposition forces in the Ministry of the Interior, army, 
government and regional authorities were duly quelled.
274
 Since 1993, allegation 
and Aliyev regime‟s repression have produced a fragmented opposition.275 Voters 
get disoriented by the practice of Azerbaijani authorities to establish alternative 
parties, by using traitor members of political forces against whom these 
countervailing parties are being established.
276
 
Opposition leaders criticize the regime openly and harshly, organize 
demonstrations and rallies demanding president‟s resignation. They attack any plans 
to cerate a dynastic state, but they have not the leverage of public support. 
Opposition parties lack a comprehensive political platform that could attract large 
number of supporters. Political indifference of Azerbaijani citizenry stems from the 
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general conviction that the opposition‟s real aim is to gain access to the nation‟s oil 
revenue by replacing the regime which is currently benefiting it.
277
 Like the 
government opposition politicians understand the problems of society, like 
unemployment, uneven development, yet do not better than the government at 
proposing constructive means to solve them. Instead, many opposition leaders give 
the impression of pursuing individual agendas. This struggle leaves the majority of 
the population politically alienated.
278
 Besides, for an overwhelming majority, 
stability and survival are more urgent than the abstract concepts of democracy. As 
connoted by an Azerbaijani citizen, 
When a man cannot afford to feed his children, cannot afford to send 
them school, the democracy is the last thing he thinks about, if he thinks 
about it at all. When the Iraqi people were asked “Whether they were 
better off during Saddam rule” almost %80 said yes, they were. If this is 
the democracy, which USA trying to bring to people of Iraq, which 
Farid Bey also wants for Azerbaijan, then I would rather live under 
dictatorship, but have a job, security and able to send my children to 
school. People needs job, security, economic and financial stability and 
peace so that they can get on with their lives, but not empty words of 
democracy.
279
  
 
4.6. Conclusion  
After the seventy year of security-centered rule of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan 
gained its sovereignty in 1991, in a period of the collapse of the communist system 
and triumph of liberal democracy. Restoration of Azerbaijani independence would 
go together with the establishment of democracy and its institutions that are to some 
extend foreign to Azerbaijani population because of the Soviet dominance and 
powerful family and clan relations within the Azerbaijani society. On the other 
hand, the process of independence and democracy establishment had to be realized 
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at the same time with Azerbaijan‟s war with Armenia in Upper-Karabakh. Like all 
other newly independent states, Azerbaijan was facing the problems of political and 
economic development and security maintenance simultaneously. The continuing 
military conflict further complicated the situation for both the Azerbaijani citizens 
and rulers. The conflict became an all encompassing issue for every Azerbaijani. 
National newspapers paid enormous attention to the military theme. National 
security concern and liberation of the invaded territories became the utmost 
issues.
280
  
The developments in the battlefield directly affected the political arena and 
stability in Azerbaijan. Failures in the war led power to change hands many times in 
a very short period of time.
281
 Meanwhile, the economy of the country and the living 
conditions were in a continuous decay. The influx of one million refugees and 
displaced persons from the invaded cities made the situation worse. Heydar Aliyev, 
came to power after the deposition of Elçibey -first elected president of Azerbaijan- 
by a military overthrow, and faced two military coup attempts in two years, adopted 
security fist approach in order to maintain stability for the political and economic 
development of the country. Becoming president, Heydar Aliyev kept the state of 
emergency introduced by Elçibey -mass demonstrations and meetings were not 
allowed, the media were subject to censorship- to provide stability and prevent a 
state failure. To overcome the stalemate in military conflict, which was also the 
main reason of instability and economic hardship, he signed ceasefire agreement 
with Armenia in 1994.  The stability came with the ceasefire, provided the necessary 
environment for Western companies to invest in Azerbaijani oil. Foreign investment 
was very important, because Azerbaijan lacked the necessary infrastructure to 
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extract and export the major energy resources it has.
282
 In addition to providing 
political stability through ceasefire agreement and attracting foreign investment by 
signing oil contracts with Western oil companies, Heydar Aliyev took necessary 
steps for the foundation of an Azerbaijani army. Since Azerbaijan had not its own 
army, during the war with Armenia volunteers did the necessary job. This 
heightened the significance of the military capability.
283
 
Therefore, it can be argued that both the internal and external factors 
supported the adoption of security first approach in Azerbaijan. Becoming 
independent during a continuous military conflict with its neighbour escalated 
Azerbaijan‟s security and democracy challenge. Disastrous impact of war on every 
aspect of life, led Azerbaijani rulers to evolve an assumption that without the 
maintenance of security and stability political and economic prosperity is not 
possible. However, it is interesting that the priority of security and stability has been 
kept after the ceasefire with Armenia and some economic growth, which became 
possible by the revenue gained through oil export. Security and stability have 
constantly been kept on the public agenda due to the unresolved conflict between 
Armenia. Both the ruling elite and the opposition have used Karabakh problem as a 
tool of internal politics and a way to gain public support. While opposition has 
presented the unresolved conflict as a failure of Aliyev regimes and argued for more 
aggressive attitude for solution, rulers accused the previous regime -now the 
opposition- and the internal turmoil for the defeat in the war and chose to limit the 
political arena and restrain media and civil society in the name of providing 
stability.
284
 The internal and external context that gave way to the prioritization of 
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security have at the same time resulted in the increase of Aliyev regime‟s power and 
control over Azerbaijani politics and economy. Especially the backing of Western 
countries to Aliyev regimes, for their energy and strategic interests, add to regimes‟ 
power.  
Both Heydar and İlham Aliyev cooperated with the U.S. and other Western 
countries, regarding the integration of Azerbaijan to the Western structures, security 
of energy sources and routes, international counter terrorism efforts.
285
 Heydar 
Aliyev‟s main political message has always been stability and Western-oriented 
policy. Aliyev regimes paid attention to the opinion of the West, with which they 
negotiated oil investment contracts. Therefore, the democracy demand of the West 
has tried to be realized by the rulers, although limited in the form of the semi-free 
press, opposition and civil society.
286
 On the other hand, foreign criticism was not 
harsh. The commercial energy interests and search for strategic advantage in the 
region led Western powers to have good relations with the regime and make soft 
criticism on the irregularities with regard to elections, government pressure on 
media, civil society and opposition.
287
 The cooperation between the Azerbaijani 
governments and Western powers, and their prioritization of security and stability 
over democracy promotion, has provided the regimes with diplomatic backing and 
strengthened their position in internal politics.   
Lack of effective opposition and the successful economic growth have 
further strengthened the Aliyev regimes‟ position regarding prioritizing stability and 
security issues, with the aim of holding on power. This actually stems from a special 
feature of Azerbaijani politics: the significance of kinship ties and loyalties with 
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regional-based clans functioning as effective pressure groups.
288
 In Azerbaijan, 
political parties and other political formations evolve around persons rather than on 
ideas or perceptions. The power of the person on the other hand does not come from 
its personal qualities or ideas, but rather from the potential gains and loses that will 
be resulted from being a supporter of him/her. As a result a significant amount of the 
state officials, bureaucrats from all sectors including military, economy, education 
and health sectors, and the members of the NAP, are either relatives of Aliyev or 
those reliant on Aliyev regime for personal gain. Even the most of the media and 
civil society organizations are dependent upon the regime.
289
 This dependency has 
furthered by government‟s significant investment on public projects with the money 
earned from oil export. When it is thought that ordinary citizens first of all think 
about the opportunities they have in their daily lives, such as having a job, a good 
education and health system rather than right to vote, to assemble and to free speech, 
the money spent on public projects provide performance legitimacy to the regime.  
Farid Guliyev explains Azerbaijani experience as “a reverse trajectory of 
transition: not from authoritarianism to democracy but from a democracy oriented 
rule to semiauthoritarianism”.290 This reverse trajectory can argued to become 
possible through the adoption of security first understanding that has found life by 
the utilization of Karabakh conflict and West‟s support to Aliyev regimes in line 
with their strategic and energy security concerns. Azerbaijan‟s first democracy 
experiment started with Elçibey‟s election as the first president. During Elçibey‟s 
presidency and PFP‟s government many steps taken on the way to democracy and 
this attempt was continued during the first years of Heydar Aliyev‟s presidency and 
NAP government. However, military coup attempts and the political instability led 
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Heydar Aliyev to fell threatened and put restrains on opposition and civil society, 
which slowed down the democratization process. This process has further been 
damaged by the amendments to the constitution just before 2003 presidential 
elections, with the aim of opening İlham Aliyev‟s way for presidency. Since 
Azerbaijani society and politics base on family and clan relations, the only way to 
be successful and powerful for a family or clan is to be holding on power. Since 
İlham Aliyev‟s public support is not strong as of his father, who is accepted as the 
founder of Azerbaijan and provider of peace, stability and economic development to 
the country, he continues to restrict political arena as much as possible without 
being much criticized by the West. It would not be right to say that the political 
system in Azerbaijan is authoritarianism, because it has adopted democratic 
institutional and legal setups, and the opposition and media can criticize the regime 
and its policies openly. However, the way the institutions work and the way the 
rules are implemented are not in line with democracy. However, through the use of 
Karabakh conflict; policies prioritizing stability and security at the expense of 
democracy are legitimized, while the support of Western powers and the economic 
growth due to oil revenues provide the regime with certain performance legitimacy.  
According to Carathers, Azerbaijan is characterized by the “domination of a 
single political actor”, and since this provides a certain degree of stability it is 
difficult for the country to move out of it.
291
 Hence it is not reasonable to expect the 
regime, having both political and economic power, to implement democratic rules 
and remove political restrictions with taking the risk of loosing power. And it is also 
not reasonable to expect Western states, as the highest per capita consumers of 
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energy, to alienate the Aliyev regime by criticizing it for undemocratic policies with 
taking the risk of loosing energy supplier.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 COMPARISON OF THE TWO CASES 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
As argued in the previous chapters, Singapore and Azerbaijan are interesting cases 
for studying security first approach on developing world and explaining the impact 
of security first understanding on democracy. The governments of the both countries 
have adopted security first approach while trying to establish their independence and 
continued this understanding till now. The context and circumstances that gave way 
to the adoption of security first understanding have both similarities and 
dissimilarities in two countries. Both were ruled by security-centered political 
systems before the independence and by the time they became sovereign states they 
faced challenges of political development, economic growth and security 
simultaneously with weak institutional and political capability and limited human 
and economic sources. While Singapore gained its independence in the years of 
Cold War, as a small city state, with a multiethnic society, Azerbaijan became 
independent by the collapse of the Soviet Union, in a conflictual region, at war with 
its neighbour. In both cases, the primacy of the need for security and stability has 
been kept on the public agenda by the ruling elite, led the implication of 
undemocratic rules, and restrictions on opposition, civil society and media. 
Although in Singapore and Azerbaijan democratic institutional and legal setups 
were adopted and societies are opening up to accommodate more rights associated 
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with liberal democracy, this has not been allowed to occur at the expense of security 
and stability, which contribute to the power of the rulers.  
This chapter aims to make a comparative analysis of the manipulation of the 
vulnerabilities, the objective dimension giving way to premium of security, of 
Singapore and Azerbaijan by rulers in order to emphasize the need to security and 
stability during the restoration of independence and further continuance of this 
attitude at the expense of democracy to be able to hold on to power. It composes 
three parts. In the first part utilization of the weakness and difficulties faced by the 
countries to prioritize security and to keep security concerns on public agenda is 
explained. In the second part the support of Western countries to security first 
understanding of these regimes in line with their economic, political and security 
interests and affect of this position on democratization of Singapore and Azerbaijan 
are explored. In the third part, prioritization of security at the expense of democracy 
is highlighted. 
 
5.2. Manipulation of Vulnerabilities  
Singapore was a British colony, while Azerbaijan was under Soviet dominance 
before the independence, and they both inherited security-centered rules of the 
previous governance. When they became independent, societies were not familiar 
with democracy, they did not have democratic institutions, their own army and 
effective economic structures to improve on. Like the all developing countries, both 
Singapore and Azerbaijan faced the challenges of political development, security 
and economic growth simultaneously. Singapore‟s vulnerability as a multiethnic 
small country lacking of natural resources compared to its Malay populated larger 
neighbors in Southeast Asia and its total dependency on the external world for its 
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economy provided the politicians with effective rationale in convincing 
Singaporeans of the urgency of the survival issue.
293
 Azerbaijan became 
independent, while it was in a military conflict with Armenia. Society‟s and media‟s 
interest in the war was enormous. National security concerns became the top priority 
and responding to the immediate needs of a million refugees and the internally 
displaced population absorbed the most of the resources. Moreover, war led the rise 
of patriotic feelings and society became ready to make any sacrifices to release the 
invaded cities.
294
 The continuous war had a disturbing impact on all aspects of life. 
The incompetence of the governments with regard to the war, created a great 
instability in Azerbaijani politics. The country faced resistance movements, rebels 
and military coups and various governments in a very short term. To maintain 
stability, rulers adopted state of emergency, mass movements and demonstrations 
were banned and a censorship was put on media. Political turmoil and instability 
was shown as the cause of failure at the battlefield.
295
  
Azerbaijan was facing a real military conflict, whereas Singapore not. It felt 
threatened because of its smallness, large neighbours, multiethnic society and 
economy‟s reliance on foreign investment. The ruling elite of Singapore presented 
these vulnerabilities as a real issue of endurance of the country and society. 
According to PAP, to overcome this problem there was need to an effective defence 
capability and stability. Defence capability does not only encompass a strong army 
and armament but also physiological, economic, civil and social defence that covers 
and shapes all sectors. The rationale behind this understanding was the need to 
foreign investment. Economic growth was presented as the only way of surviving 
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and it was possible by attracting foreign direct investment, which requires stability 
and predictability.
296
 In order to maintain a stable environment for foreign 
investment, the political opposition and civil society was pressurized, ethnic groups 
and media were controlled. Thus, in Singapore, the vulnerabilities have been 
manipulated to stress the importance of security and stability. The objective 
dimensions of the need to security has been kept on the agenda and fragility of 
stability and order continuously reminded, due to the perception of challenges by 
elites, in which democratization is seen as a destabilizing process and instability 
causing political, economic and military failure. The need to economic development 
was presented as a survival issue and took its place as the major security concern. In 
addition the way to development was also based on security, because development 
was argued to be preceded by security. Azerbaijan had a real security concern, yet 
rulers have used it to restrain the political and civil rights and get public support, 
while the opposition has been utilized from the conflict as a way to criticize the 
government. Karabakh Conflict has been kept on public agenda by Aliyev regimes, 
after the ceasefire agreed between Azerbaijan and Armenia, through the use of 
national media and especially in rationalizing the measures suppressing protests at 
the conduct of the elections.
297
 Thus, in both countries the ruling elite has stressed 
the significance of security concerns, tried to keep the stability issue on the agenda 
through use of media or education programs, and reminded the fragility of order to 
keep opposition under control.  
 
5.3. Prioritization of Security and Stability by Western Powers 
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Singapore‟s independence came during Cold War, so rather than the promotion of 
democracy, security of the West and of strategic allies was important. State security, 
military capabilities, maintenance of bipolar structure and advancement of 
capitalism were among the top priorities. Rapid economic growth of Singapore, 
based on capitalist market economy was a model against communist China. 
Therefore, the so called First World of the Cold War era, supported the economic 
development of Singapore. In addition the stability of the country has provided a 
safe and lucrative place for Western investors.
298
 The necessity to stability for 
drawing foreign investment to the country was not only highlighted by PAP 
governments but also Azerbaijani rulers. Azerbaijani independence came at the 
collapse of Soviet Union and triumph of democracy arguments, hence democracy 
promotion became more important. Yet energy and strategic interests of West led 
the continuation of the premium on security and stability. The stability of 
Azerbaijan as a supplier of oil and contributor of international counterterrorism 
efforts turned out to be the concern of the U.S. and European powers. This concern 
in turn provided external backing to Aliyev regimes, and strengthened regimes‟ 
hand in domestic politics.
299
 In both cases, the attitude of the Western powers 
supported the prioritization of security. Moreover, this support encouraged ruling 
elites of Singapore and Azerbaijan in pursuing security first understanding at the 
expense of democracy.  
 
5.4. Security at the Expense of Democracy  
Both in Singapore and Azerbaijan, the internal and external context has been used 
and even manipulated to prioritize security, yet what is more important is that 
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security and stability have been prioritized at the expense of democracy and 
vulnerabilities presented as justification for limiting political and civil rights. In 
Singapore, anti-disorder legislation was adopted, by which political opposition and 
social behaviour were coerced and strikes, riots and mass protest were avoided, in 
order to maintain a stable environment for foreign investment.
300
 In Azerbaijan, 
Heydar Aliyev, coming to power after the deposition of Elçibey by a military 
overthrow, and dealing with two military coup attempts in consequent years, kept 
the state of emergency introduced by Elçibey, to maintain stability and avoid a king 
of government and state failure. However, the challenges faced by Heydar Aliyev 
influenced his threat perception and resorted him to restrict any attempt that might 
lead instability. Mass demonstrations and meetings were not allowed, the media 
were subject to censorship in order to maintain stability for the political and 
economic development of the country.
301
 
The counter-democratic trends came forward in both countries, following the 
post independence pluralism. The PAP was established as a mass-based democratic 
political party, consisting of people with different political views and races, with the 
aim of gaining independence. However, Lee Kuan Yew‟s faction that controlled the 
executive of the PAP used this advantage to reform the party structure to centralize 
power in their hands before the 1959 election and coerced their opponents.
302
 The 
PAP governments have pursued various undemocratic strategies -detention without 
trial, deregistration and replacement of radical unions with compliant ones, 
withdrawal of license from newspapers deemed to be opposed to national interests, 
political re-education of civil servants to reduce the independence of the civil 
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service and bind it to the government‟s agenda- to suppress opposition.303 1992 
Azerbaijani presidential election is accepted as one of the freest elections among the 
post-Soviet geography. The PFP government laid the basis for democracy in the 
country, in spite of the continuing military conflict with Armenia. On the verge of 
Heydar Aliyev‟s presidency, a legislative reform prepared the ground for elections, 
press censorship was abolished and opposition media started to function, despite the 
difficulties.
304
  Yet, the ceasefire with Armenia led Heydar Aliyev to tighten his 
control of the state administration. After dispensing coup leaders Suret Huseynov 
and Rovshan Javadov, Aliyev ensured that opposition forces in the Ministry of the 
Interior, army, government and regional authorities were put down, and the regime‟s 
repression have produced a fragmented opposition.
305
 Several prominent officials, 
those opposed to President İlham Aliyev‟s policies were arrested on charges of 
coup-plotting.
306
 
Both in Singapore and Azerbaijan, series of constraints on civil activities 
have been uphold, while the regularly meeting groups have to be registered formally 
and a permit has to be taken out for any public assembly or procession in any public 
place. Media sector encounters numerous obstacles conducting its work and 
maintaining independence, including informal censorship, charges for defamation or 
inciting ethnic and religious hatred and financial penalties. Election codes and 
constitution have been amended in order to keep the PAP government and Aliyev 
regimes in power.
307
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With their worry to lose security and stability and their drive for political 
supremacy the PAP governments in Singapore and Aliyev regimes in Azerbaijan, 
have manipulated the vulnerabilities of the country with regard to security and 
economy, to highlight the need to security and order, which has made it easier for 
governors to limit the political and social opposition in the name of stability. The 
dominance of PAP and Aliyevs became possible by the virtual merging of state and 
party in Singapore and clientelistic relationships in Azerbaijan. Due to the party 
structure in Singapore, policy formation became the total preserve of the PAP 
executive in conjunction with senior civil servants. New civil service appointments 
then extended PAP control over the state apparatus and as a result, the upper levels 
of the civil service became the standard route to political leadership.
308
 The division 
of Azerbaijani ruling elite among several clans, mainly structured around regional 
and patronage relationships, has also linked the political institutions to these clan 
structures and the ruling elite. Many NAP members and bureaucrats are from the 
Aliyev family or their relatives. 
309
 
In addition, both in Singapore and Azerbaijan, the political economy 
relations are also used as the base of the regime‟s power. The form of state 
capitalism rendered many Singaporeans dependent on the state for economic and 
social resources, including housing, employment and business contracts. Increasing 
wealth and industrialization tend to raise the income of workers and to expand the 
size of the middle class, thereby giving more people a stake in the existing 
socioeconomic order.
310
 In a similar way, the money gained through oil exports have 
strengthened Azerbaijani governments‟ economic facility and led governments, 
through public spending, to get public support. An important number of people have 
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a vested interest in maintaining the current regime in power because of their 
dependency on patronage from İlham Aliyev for their political or economic 
position.
311
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Singapore and Azerbaijan, gaining their independence in different international 
conjunctures with some similar internal and external circumstances and facing 
political development, economic growth and security challenges simultaneously, 
have adopted security first approach. While the need to security was obvious in the 
case of Azerbaijan, being a military conflict with its neighbour and having a million 
displaced people, in Singapore the situation with regard to security was not that 
problematic, yet potential threats especially economic difficulties have been 
presented as a survival issue that requires ultimate stability and effective defence 
capability. In two cases, stability was shown as the main requirement of gaining the 
confidence of foreign investors, without which economic development would not be 
realized and the future of the country would be blurred. What is more significant is 
that in both countries, vulnerabilities have been utilized to keep the security 
concerns on public agenda and restrain the political opposition and civil society. So 
not only a premium was put on security, but it was also prioritized at the expense of 
democracy. Democratization is considered problematic for the political stability and 
economic development of the country. The openness came with democratization 
gave way to the emergence of new demands of different groups. The ethnic riots in 
July and September 1964 and ethnic clashes in 1969 in Singapore, following the 
outbreak of riots in Malaysia after its general election, and the influence of 
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communist China on Chinese Singaporeans enhanced the sense of vulnerability of 
the PAP government, whereas in Azerbaijan the oppositionary movements and 
rebels due to the developments in the battlefield heightened the sense of 
vulnerability.
312
 Political instability is a challenge not only for the state, but also for 
the longevity of the regime and for the economic development. Therefore, the 
governments of the both countries have continuously highlighted the need to 
stability and its importance for the countries‟ future. Democratization has also been 
a challenge for the ruling elites due to its requirement of governance by rule of law 
and accountability of rules. Democratization is argued to be initiated 
[W]hen multiparty system exists and the first set of free and fair 
elections for national level office take place. This first set of elections 
must be accompanied in short order by the granting of civil liberties and 
political rights and the establishment of both state institutions that 
operate according to the rule of law and intermediate organizations that 
mediate between the citizen and the state. If these events do not take 
place, then it is likely that the process of democratization will not be 
fully consolidated.
313
  
 
Both countries have adopted democratic institutional and legal setups, 
however it is not possible to say that they are democracies. The possibility of losing 
security and government created a constant delay in democratization. While regular 
elections constitute the legitimacy of the regimes, the location of formal institutions 
within wider power relationships -the combination of state and PAP in Singapore 
and patronage and clan relations of ruling elites in Azerbaijan- in addition to 
prioritization of security, led the implementation of various undemocratic strategies 
and policies by governors. Considering the interest of the Western countries in the 
stability of these countries, and obviously the regimes, and the stake that many 
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citizens have in the existing political and socio-economic system, it is difficult to 
expect a real democratic reform to take place in these countries. In both countries, 
regimes have been successful in maintaining security and stability, yet this did not 
give way to the gradual triumph of democracy as argued by security first approach. 
The cooperation of the Western powers with the governments of these countries can 
be argued to contribute to the security of the states and the regimes, but neither the 
democratization process nor the security of the people.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Explaining the relationship between security and democracy is as difficult as 
conceptualizing the two terms since they are likely to mean different things to 
different people. While some scholars see a positive relationship between security 
and democracy, others emphasize the negative impact of one on the other. 
Alternatively, a group of studies accept democratization as a way to provide 
security, whereas others argue for the need to security as a foundation on which 
democracy can be instituted. Security first approach supports the latter view. In the 
previous chapters, security first approach and its assumptions are explained and two 
countries, Singapore and Azerbaijan that adopted security first understanding are 
analyzed. Here the three assumptions of security first approach will be disused on 
these two cases, the main findings of the study will be stated and the ways to 
convert these findings to policy implementation will be discussed.   
 
6.1. Application of Security First Approach’s Assumptions on Cases 
The assumptions are: 1. the need to set clear priorities due to the resource scarcity -
institutional capacity, qualified personnel, economic means, time- 2. first security 
must be established, then democracy would develop internally and gradually, 3. U.S. 
 118 
should work with illiberal moderates, those not liberal but against the use of 
violence and terror, for both its own security and the international security.  
 Security first approach derives from the postulation that the scarcity of 
resources forces people to make a choice among the needs or sought values. Even 
the U.S., as the most powerful state of the world, does not have unlimited resources. 
Therefore it has to set the priorities of its foreign policy in accordance with its 
available resources. When it comes to the establishment of security and democracy, 
which are the two good deeds people want to have all together, in failed or rogue 
states, priority should be given to the establishment of security. According to 
Etzioni, security is first, because it is the basic value on which the other values are 
founded. If basic security is not provided and people face the possibility of being 
attacked or murdered any time, than it is not possible to consolidate democracy or 
economic development.  Once security is maintained, the necessary environment 
would be created for democracy to internally and gradually develop.
314
 Drawing 
from this assumption, it is possible to argue that for the developing world, facing the 
severe pressure of building security, democracy and development with limited 
political and institutional capacity, economic and human sources and time, making a 
prioritization between democracy and security is unavoidable. Since democracy 
cannot be consolidated without security, they have to put the premium on security. 
By arguing that democracy would phase after security is established, this approach 
also assumes that the ruling elites that make and imply security-centered policies, 
would at a certain point decide that security is maintained at sufficient level and now 
it is time to take necessary steps for democratization. Though the context, 
circumstances, needs and available resources shape how polices are made and 
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operationalized, the perceptions and choices of the ruling elites also influence the 
policies. At last, it is a political choice to prioritize a thing over others and shift 
priorities in line with changes in the context, capabilities etc.  
Did the scarcity of resources force the rulers of Singapore and Azerbaijan to 
adopt security first approach? As newly independent states, both of them faced 
concurrent challenges of political and economic development and security. They 
were not familiar with democracy and its institutions, their economies were in decay 
and did not have their own militaries. Not only the internal context but also external 
one provided the rationale for prioritizing security and stability issues. The situation 
in Azerbaijan was really severe. It was in a military conflict with its neighbour and 
one eight of its population became either refugees or displayed persons. War and 
security became the utmost concern for the whole society. In the case of Singapore, 
there was not a real military conflict or a foreign attack. Yet ruling elites have 
presented the smallness of the country, its containment with Malay populated big 
neighbours and its dependency to the foreign direct investment for the economic 
growth as a survival issue. The establishment of an effective defence capability, 
which has been necessary to persuade foreign investors that the country is able to 
protect itself and avoid instability, has became a part of development strategy. The 
need to attract foreign investment to extract and export the hydrocarbon resources 
has also been used as the rationale for the need to stability in Azerbaijan.  
So both countries faced the problematic of resource scarcity and challenge of 
doing many things at the same time with little sources, Azerbaijan even more. Not 
only the rulers but citizens feel the same pressure on themselves, and most probably 
they prefer, as stated by one of the Azerbaijani, to be safe and able to get on with 
 120 
their lives under an autocracy, rather than abstract concepts of democracy.
315
 As 
Etzioni argues people might trade democracy for security, because “[o]nly once 
security is reasonably secured do people become keen to have their legal and 
political rights respected”.316 Is the establishment of security really followed by 
consolidation of democracy and the rise of demand for democratic rights? 
In the cases of this study, maintenance of security did not lead the 
consolidation of democracy. In Azerbaijan, the priority of security and stability has 
been reserved after the ceasefire agreement with Armenia and economic growth, 
which became possible by the revenue gained through oil export. Security and 
stability have constantly been kept on the public agenda due to the unresolved 
conflict with Armenia. Both the ruling elite and the opposition have used Karabakh 
problem as a tool of internal politics and a way to gain public support. While 
opposition has presented the unresolved conflict as a failure of Aliyev regimes and 
argued for more aggressive attitude for solution, rulers accused the previous regime 
-now the opposition- and the internal turmoil for the defeat in the war and chose to 
limit the political arena and restrain media and civil society in the name of providing 
stability.
317
 The Singaporean elites evolved their survival ideology on economic 
prosperity, politically stable environment and effective defence capability 
assumptions. The survival mentality encompasses not only military and economic 
sectors but also all other sections of life, because the total defence strategy includes 
physiological, societal, civil and economic defence in addition to military defence. 
Furthermore, significance of the survival issue has been kept on the public agenda 
through the use of media and the education programs, although the country has not 
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faced a real threat or aggression from its neighbours. Asian values, emphasizing 
common good and order rather than individual rights, has been utilized as the moral 
base of survival ideology.
318
 In both cases, the internal and external context that 
gave way to the prioritization of security have further utilized by the ruling elite to 
increase the regimes‟ power and control over all sectors.319 Hence it is possible to 
argue that the ruling elite, who decide to put premium on security due to scarcity 
and time pressure and various challenges and build up security-centered policies, 
have not been persuaded that security is maintained at sufficient level and therefore 
they have not decided to take necessary steps for democratization. Another 
supposition would be that since the prioritization of security provides the ruling elite 
with the rationale to limit political and social opposition and to increase their power 
and control, in the name of stability and security, they would like to continue this 
system.  
Moreover, citizens and social groups, incorporated into the system through 
economic growth, social projects, public spending, having a stake in the exiting 
regime, and fearing to lose their privileged positions, would not want a dramatic 
change at the current system. As with geopolitical, economic and security 
considerations have given the Western countries an incentive to put a premium on 
stability in their relations with Singapore and Azerbaijan, and the existing regimes 
providing stability and security, West is neither expected to demand a change. So, 
when we consider the third assumption of security first approach- U.S. should work 
with illiberal moderates, those not liberal but against the use of violence and terror, 
for both its own security and the international security- in our cases, it can be argued 
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that the impact of West‟s cooperation with the “illiberal moderates”, for the 
maintenance of West‟s and international security, does not contribute to the 
democratization of the concerned countries. 
Security first understanding argues that while dealing with autocratic 
countries in transition to democracy, U.S. can work with “illiberal moderates” 
referring to “those who disavow violence but who do not necessarily favor a liberal-
democratic regime or full program of human rights”, given that they provide basic 
security, do not avoid democratization in the long run and contribute to the 
international counter-terrorism efforts.
320
 Libya is given as a small but effective 
example. After Libya gave up its support for terrorism and ceased its program for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the U.S. government allowed Libya to emerge from 
isolation and sanctions, despite the fact that it has barely begun to reform its 
authoritarian regime. For Etzioni, such reforms can be promoted later as a second 
stage. Many elements of the existing regime should be kept in place, while 
considerable time should be allowed for new forces to grow.
321
 However, having 
relationship with illiberal moderates for the security of the world, West and U.S. in 
particular, might provide those illiberal moderates with international backing and 
increase their power internally as a result, cause a delay in the democratization 
process due to presented security needs. Actually this happened in the cases of 
Singapore and Azerbaijan.  
For the U.S. and West, establishment of security and order in Singapore, was 
important to provide a stable environment for foreign investments, which would 
trigger economic development and in turn avoid the progress of communism in the 
region. They supported rise of Singapore‟s state power and promoted the country as 
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an ideal model for economic and political development. The U.S. and West with 
their strategic interests in mind, were slow or even reluctant to exercise their 
political and economic power to promote democratic change among their security 
allies during the Cold War years and they tolerated authoritarian regimes to sustain 
key Cold War security partners.
322
 In a similar way, the U.S. favored present leaders 
in Azerbaijan throughout the last decade as more coherent points of contact able to 
manipulate state and economy to its strategic interests.
323
 The stability of the 
Caucasus, necessary to keep the transport of Caspian oil and gas uninterrupted, is 
very important for the investing companies and strategic interests of Western 
countries. In addition to energy needs, the Caucasus region is the crucial link 
between Central Asia and Europe; therefore its political stability and economic 
development is important to U.S. national security interests. The Caucasus countries 
are becoming more important security allies in the U.S. led campaign against 
terrorism.
324
 Hence Western powers are not eager for a democratic change at the 
expense of distancing a regime they see as a partner in fighting terrorism and a force 
promoting key Western oil interest.
325
 
 
6.2. Main Findings of the Thesis 
Much discussed stability versus democracy dilemma in Western foreign policy, and 
many argued that security, terrorism concerns and interests in the energy resources 
should not be led to overwhelm democratization, civil society building and human 
rights. Moreover it is highlighted that working with non-democratic leaders for the 
sake of regional strategic and security considerations can have negative implications 
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for American prestige and ability to develop relationships with today‟s opposition 
and probably tomorrow‟s rulers.326 Whereas Etzioni advocates the cooperation with 
illiberal moderates and the prioritization of security over democracy in foreign 
policy formulation. He states that if the U.S. aims to democratize the world, most of 
the countries would resists or not cooperate, if it aims to provide security for itself 
and the world, the majority of the states and people will share this goal. Favoring 
democracy as public diplomacy might lead people across the world to question the 
support given by the U.S. to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
327
 The orientation of the 
foreign policy of the U.S. and West is important due to its reflections on developing 
world and on the democratization process of these countries. As discussed in the 
cases of Singapore and Azerbaijan, prioritization of security has been eventuated at 
the expanse of democracy. The regimes accept some democracy in the form of the 
semi-free elections, press, opposition and civil society, to provide legitimacy for 
their rule in the eyes of the domestic and international community. Yet, 
democratization has not allowed occurring at the expense of security and political 
stability. Actually it is not possible to prioritize a thing without downgrading 
another. But, it is a fact that security and democracy are two values that both are 
inevitably necessary for the people in the modern world system, and they are not 
luxuries to be delayed until first the other is maintained. Prioritizing security and 
then expecting democracy to develop gradually and internally on the basic value of 
security might not work well. As shown in the cases of Singapore and Azerbaijan, 
the interests of the ruling elite, Western powers and those people and groups having 
vested interests in the existing system gave way to continues utilization of the need 
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to security and stability at the expense of democracy. Accordingly, especially in the 
developing world, the purpose should be striving for security and democracy 
concurrently, rather than prioritizing security and presenting it as the precondition of 
democracy, because prioritization of security and implementation of security-
centered polices increase the power and control of the regime over society and all 
the sectors, which in turn lets the ruling elites to utilize the need to stability and 
security for the continuation of  security-centered policies and their control over 
country. 
Nevertheless the fact that democracy and security are both needed without 
any prioritization, the relationship between the two is not linear or affirmative at all 
times. There are many researches, on the one hand showing the pacifying impact of 
democracy both at intra-state and interstate levels, on the other hand criticizing 
democratic peace approach, explaining that there is not a definite positive linkage 
between democracy and peace or security.
328
 There are also studies emphasizing the 
instability impact of democratization causing civil or international conflict, as well 
as the pressures of security, preventing the maintenance of democratic process or 
forestalling democratic movements in democratizing countries and use of political 
repression by rulers against people for the sake of stability.
329
 Etzioni develops 
security first approach due to the inability of democratic peace approach, on which 
democracy promotion became a key strategy of U.S. foreign policy in the last 
decades. While democratic peace presents democracy as precondition of security, 
Etzioni does the other way around by his security first argument. However, the cases 
of this study show that putting the premium on security and expecting democracy to 
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phase internally did not work. Hence the discussion in the Western foreign policy 
should not be security versus democracy or presenting one of them as the 
precondition of the other, but rather how to maintain security and democracy in the 
developing world without making any prioritization. Hence, security first approach 
might also be revised in this direction. While Etzioni argues first for security and 
claiming to propose a pragmatic and moral foreign policy, he considers the interests 
of the U.S. and tries to offer a foreign policy that is justifiable and acceptable for 
both U.S. citizens and citizens of the other states. Here, morality argument is not for 
the maintenance of justice or the well-being of the citizens of the concerned country. 
In foreign policy, a state would follow its own interests, this is inevitable. Yet, 
arguing for a moral foreign policy, which first of all considers the basic security of 
the citizens and then the promotion of democracy, on the other hand advocating 
cooperation with ruling elites that follow undemocratic policies for security, 
investment, energy or terrorism concerns is paradoxical. A more coherent and 
plausible foreign policy, with regard to developing world, should take into account 
the concurrent need of these countries to security and democracy and accordingly, 
aim to maintain security and democracy without relegating democracy to secondary 
position.  
The case countries of this study faced the problematic of resource scarcity 
and challenge of doing many things at the same time and both of the governments 
have adopted security first approach. What is more critical is that the vulnerabilities 
of the countries have been utilized by governors to continue the security-centered 
policies that increase regimes‟ power. The objective dimensions of the need to 
security and stability have been manipulated by rulers. While Singapore‟s 
vulnerability as a small territory lacking of natural resources compared to its 
 127 
relatively larger and Malay dominated neighbors in Southeast Asia and its total 
dependency on the external world for its livelihood provided the politicians the 
rationale in convincing Singaporeans of the urgency of the survival issue, 
Azerbaijani political elite has used Karabakh conflict to justify measures repressing 
the civil society and opposition. The regimes also consistently appealed to the need 
for social stability, due to the need to foreign investment for economic 
development.
330
 For both Singapore and Azerbaijan there were many, some of 
which common, factors that gave way to the adoption of security first approach, 
such as historical legacy, need to stability for economic development and interest of 
the Western powers. However, the main reason of constant keep of security and 
stability concerns on the public agenda and use of undemocratic and repressive 
measures in the name of security and stability was ruling elites‟ concern with regard 
to losing everything that they have when they lose security and governance. 
Singapore is a multiethnic country having 14% Malay population neighboured by 
mostly Malay populated big neighbours. It is economically and geographically 
dependent to external world. These realities have put pressure on English speaking 
Chinese rulers, who supports liberalism in economy. This is why Lee Kuan Yew as 
an English speaking Chinese, increased the power of the executive branch of PAP 
against the other branches consisting of other ethnicities and communists. The 
democratic trend that emerged just after the independence came to an end by 
undemocratic measures applied in order to maintain stability and security. A similar 
process has been experienced in Azerbaijan. Being in war and facing a real military 
threat made it easier for Azerbaijani rulers to limit political and social freedoms. 
Personal, family and clan relations and struggles and competition between these 
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families and clans are an inherent part of Azerbaijani society. Hence holding the 
political power at hand is the safest way of being successful in any sector. With their 
fear of loosing political stability and power and their drive for political ascendancy 
the PAP governments in Singapore and Aliyev regimes in Azerbaijan, have 
manipulated the vulnerabilities of the country with regard to security and economy, 
to highlight the need to security and order, which has made it easier for governors to 
limit the political and social opposition in the name of stability. The continuance 
supremacy of security issues and depending on this the control of PAP and Aliyev 
regimes became possible by mainly three common factors: i. interests of Western 
powers, ii. weakness of the opposition parties and civil societies, iii. dependency of 
economic development to stability and economic dependency of the people to the 
state – to PAP in Singapore and to Aliyev family in Azerbaijan. To avoid the 
prioritization of security and practice of undemocratic strategies in the developing 
countries, it might be useful to raise these issues.  
 
6.3. Application of the Main Findings to Policy Making 
What kind of a foreign policy might U.S. or other Western powers develop to deal 
with these matters? First of all, as previously mentioned security, terrorism concerns 
and interests in the economy and energy resources should not be led to subjugate the 
need to democracy. It is a fact that, no country gives up its own interests. Yet, U.S. 
and other Western states should not base their foreign policy strategy only on 
realizing their interests in short term. They should consider the many-sided 
implications of pursuing their own interests on the concerned country‟s security, 
democracy and citizen‟s lives in the long-term. This would be a more acceptable 
foreign policy especially with regard to both international and domestic public. In 
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the cases of Singapore and Azerbaijan, Western powers have acted in accordance 
with their interests and cooperated with the governments without paying attention to 
the undemocratic policies that restricted political and civil life in these countries. 
This attitude further supported the prioritization of security in these countries.  
Democratization cannot be imposed by external powers, it should be 
developed by internal dynamics. Nevertheless, in a country where rulers utilize the 
weaknesses of the country to hold on to power and use undemocratic and repressive 
measures to suppress opposition and civil society, it would not be rationale to expect 
rulers to take necessary steps for democratization, which requires accountability of 
the governors and limitation of their power, without any pressure. Since the 
opposition and civil society do not have enough power to pressurize the rulers for 
democratization, efforts of external powers for the empowerment of opposition and 
civil society would contribute to the democratization process in these countries. The 
basic component of empowerment process might be education. Cross-country 
student ex-change programs and university linkages are important to train opinion 
makers that would lead the civil society and give shape to opponent‟s arguments. 
For example, education of the journalist is significant in the case of Azerbaijan. 
Many journalist and newspapers are sued by ruling elites for defamation.
331
 
Generally, they are sentenced to very high criminal penalties, but in some cases 
newspapers are closed and journalists are sentenced to imprisonment. Since a free 
media is part of democratic right of free speech, it is important to empower 
journalist through training so that they to do their job without overriding others 
rights. It is also important that external powers should reach the different segments 
of society -people with different ideologies, having different ethnicities or religions, 
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belonging to different classes- and pay attention to their concerns.  People with 
different needs should learn to raise their demands in a democratic tradition and to 
find agreeable solutions to conflictual demands. They should learn how to lobbying 
and creating a pressure on government. While trying to empower the opposition and 
civil society, it should be clarified that the aim is not to change the government. 
Actually, a change in the power does not guarantee reforms toward democratization. 
This is also essential for preventing the existing regime to practice harsher strategies 
against the opponents and civil society. Rulers might feel threatened from the 
cooperation between the external powers and opponents, think about the clandestine 
attempts for toppling the rule and as a result resort to suppressing opponents and 
civil society. External powers should try to understand the concerns of the rulers as 
well as the concerns of citizens and opponents. Additionally they should show that 
they understand and also regard these concerns. For example, in Singapore‟s case 
the Malaysia and communist China are seen as a potential threat by the PAP 
governments and led rulers to impose restrictions on Malay and Chinese-speaking 
communities.
332
 To avoid such suppression on these communities, and provide them 
with their political and civil rights on the one hand and to lessen the security 
concerns of the PAP government on the other hand, external powers might work to 
improve the good neighbourly relationships in the Southeast Asia.  
A final issue that should be dealt is the dependency of economic 
development to political stability and economic dependency of people to the 
existing regime and socio-economic order. Both in Singapore and Azerbaijan, 
foreign investment has been the only way to economic growth and stability became 
the precondition for gaining foreign companies‟ confidence. Both countries have 
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provided a secure environment for investors‟ through legal proceedings avoiding 
riots and protests. Economic considerations have given external powers an incentive 
to place stability and security first in their dealings with these countries. On the 
other hand, increasing wealth led governments, through public spending, to get 
public support and has given more people a stake in the existing system. The 
political economy relations are used as the base of the regime‟s power. People 
became dependent on the state for economic and social resources, including 
housing, employment and business contracts.
333
 As discussed previously, the 
external powers should consider the implications of their acts for the concerned 
countries. Their only criteria should not be safety and predictability for investing in 
developing countries. The government of the invested countries might be pressured 
to make reforms both at political and economic system to lessen the restrictions on 
political freedoms and the control of ruling elite on the economy. The investment 
projects might target to develop directly the region that the investment is done and 
the people living in that region with the aim of providing an equitable distribution of 
income. The investment contracts might directly be signed with local people from 
different communities of the society, having no linkage with the ruling elites or the 
government.  
What kind of policies might these countries develop to overcome the delay 
of democratization in the name of stability and security? The problem is not security 
versus democracy. They are both needed and the challenge is to build security and 
democracy concurrently, with limited sources and institutional capacity. As 
discussed previously, the relationship between security and democracy might not be 
constructive. The problem in the developing countries is that democratization is seen 
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as a threat to security and political stability due to its potential to cause instability 
and security problems, which might give way power to change hand. The possibility 
of losing political stability and power resorts the ruling elites to further centralize 
power and restrict opposition. This results in constant delay of democratization and 
liberalization. However, the curtailment or suppression of freedoms might aggravate 
the security problems of the state, regime and obviously people. When rulers repress 
the different demands of ethnic or religious groups or political opponents rather than 
trying to find ways of compromising these demands in policy making, regarding 
political, economic and security sectors, the legitimacy of the regime and the state 
becomes questionable. The weak legitimacy and lack of accountability in turn leads 
further restrictions and even aggressive policies because of the failure to establish 
fair democratic institutions and procedures to deal with different demands.
334
 Even, 
the understanding that security of state is necessary for the security of the citizens 
can not legitimize the restrictive and forceful strategies against the citizens, by this 
way, governments that are responsible to maintain peoples‟ security act in the 
direction to harm peoples‟ security in the name of avoiding state failure. Here the 
operationalization is paradoxical with the understanding. This paradoxical situation 
generally emerges, as it happened in the cases of this study, because power is hold 
by a group or class. The way that power is created and the relations between the 
groups within the state and the relations between the state and groups are organized 
is not legitimate and fair. In such a situation, the demands of other groups or classes 
are seen as a threat to the rule, as a result demands are oppressed and 
democratization is delayed. This vicious circle not only restricts the political and 
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civil rights of people but also keeps the ruling elites in a constant worry of losing 
security and power.  
To overcome this problem, the first step of the rulers might to gain 
legitimacy for their governance and continue to act in line with legitimacy. In the 
cases of Azerbaijan and Singapore, first governments came to power through 
elections, not distorted ones. But in time, they resort to undemocratic strategies and 
have used semi-free elections and social and economic projects as bases of their 
legitimacy. However, instead of implying restrictive measures against the demands 
of different groups and opponents, they might try to reconcile different demands in 
accordance with the unavoidable needs of the people and the country and available 
sources and capacity. Inclusion of different groups into the policy making procedure 
is important for the legitimacy and accountability of the rule and rulers. This might 
complicate the procedure and take more time to reach a decision, but on the other 
hand might increase the effectiveness of the policies and make the implementation 
part easier since they are made by the inclusion of different views and needs. 
Although it is difficult, strengthening the institutional capacity in order to respond 
fairly to different demands and include different views to policy making might be 
the most effective way to gain legitimacy and overcome the constant worry of 
loosing security and power. This might also provide a chance to make policies that 
considers the different aspects of the issue. For example, for the ruling elites of the 
PAP, Malay populated neighbours and communist China have been a threat due to 
their concern of the potential impact of these countries on Malay and Chinese-
speaking groups in the society. However, inclusion of these groups in policy making 
might provide the consideration of the issue from different perspectives and result in 
the formulation of good relations with these countries, establishment of economic or 
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security pacts within the region rather than restraining those groups among the 
society. In Azerbaijan, the rivalry between clans and families might become 
moderate if one of do not dominates the others and others also have a say in 
political, economic, societal life. If all are included in decision making, through 
smooth institutional and legal procedures, they would not aspire for governing as 
much as they do when they are excluded from the process.  
Another important aspect is the situation of the opposition. Both in 
Singapore and Azerbaijan, opposition is weak and do not have much influence. In 
Singapore, the most effective opposition party, Barisan Socialis boycotted 1968 
elections. The ineffectiveness of other political parties led to the dominance of the 
PAP. Similarly, in Azerbaijan opposition parties are not effective and they also 
boycotted some elections. People do not have trust in the opposition parties and 
think that if one of the opposition parties came to power than they will benefit form 
being the governor for their own interests rather than serving for the country and the 
citizens. It is vital to note that the weakness of the opposition and civil society is to 
some extend the outcome of the specific strategies of the regimes with the aim of 
restraining and dividing opposition parties and civil society. Refusing to take part in 
elections is a way of reacting and protesting, yet, the only aim of the opposition 
should not become the government. Opposition parties might act more responsibly 
and try to pressurize the government for democratization and openness through their 
effective alternative projects that acknowledge people about the shortages of the 
existing rule with regard to all sectors and necessary steps that should be taken to 
deal with these shortages. Here ordinary citizens have liability, too. Neither security 
building, nor democratization is easy and these processes create a pressure on 
people and affect every aspect of their life. Yet, people have responsibilities as they 
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have rights. Preferring to live under an autocracy and being able to go on with daily 
lives or to keep their vested interests and privileges in the existing system instead of 
abstract concepts of democracy would contribute to the postponement of 
democratization.  
There might emerge a question with regard to the applicability of these 
suggestions, since Western powers and ruling elites of the concerned countries have 
interest in the continuation of the status quo and do not want a change that would 
challenge their interests, likewise those people and groups having vested interests in 
the existing system. It is a fact that foreign policies and relationships with other 
countries are determined in accordance with interests of the state, although there 
might be some groups paying honest attention to morality of the policies. In the 
current system, it is important to develop foreign policies that are justifiable both for 
domestic and international public. A foreign policy, developed by considering the 
long-term implications of it on security, democracy, economy etc. of the concerned 
country could be more justifiable. Pressuring the governments of those countries for 
democratization is also important not because democracy is perfect as stated by 
İbrahim, but rather its being “an optimal solution based on the systems available” 
for the moment.
335
 From the perspective of the ruling elites, taking a step for 
democratization and including different people and ideas to decision making process 
would increase their legitimacy and thus decrease their anxiety about losing power 
and security. Although, the restrictive measures make it possible to control the 
opposition and maintain stability, the fragility of the power due to lack of legitimacy 
create a constant fear on the side of the ruling elites. Therefore, democratization 
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might contribute to the longevity of the government, despite the limitation it poses 
on power of the government through checks and balances.  
  
Security first approach looks at the relationship with security and democracy 
from the perspective of the U.S. foreign policy in failed and rogue states, however 
its assumptions are important due to their influence in domestic politics of 
developing countries. The issues raised about the foreign policies of Western powers 
and domestic policies of developing countries, basing on the cases of Singapore and 
Azerbaijan, might provide a tiny contribution to how security first approach be 
revised with regard to developing world, with also attention paid to internal 
dimensions. 
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